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Chapter I . Introduction 
 
In the past few years, the New Left has spread across Latin America posing the greatest challenge yet to 
Latin American democracies since the wave of democratization began in the region. Governments and leaders 
of the New Left have not only started a wave of profound institutional reform; but, most importantly, have 
begun questioning the validity of core democratic principles and values and their suitability as guidelines for 
political and social life in the region, especially those that refer to the structure of society, dealing with 
individualist versus communitarian positions, and issues of distribution of wealth and distributive justice.  
The new Latin American State, which has taken the ideology and the political and economic views of 
the New Left as the basis for its construction,  seeks to build a democracy that overcomes inequalities even if the 
price might be liberties, a democracy that is more than a mere set of procedures.  The battle between equality 
and liberty is to be solved in the reform of the democratic model, which will give the State and the government 
a new shape.  
A common place conceptual confusion between liberalism and democracy lies at the base of the New 
Left’s political project, in which democracy as it is currently in place in Latin America has to be rejected 
because it is a product of liberal thought, and liberalism is an ideology imposed on the region by the dominant 
powers, namely the United States. So, upholding democracy means giving in to a modern state of colonization, 
an ideological colonization.  
Nevertheless, it is not the contention of this ideological current or its representatives throughout the 
region that we need to give up democracy completely, but rather that we need to transform it, make it “ours” in 
a way in which it is reshaped to mirror our cultural identity, values and principles. Of course, this idea is not 
negative in itself.  
In practical terms, South American countries have shown the clearest ideological conviction and 
disposition towards reform
1
, putting in place policies of nationalization of major industry enterprises such as the 
hydrocarbons and energetic industries and policies of redistribution of wealth and alleviation of poverty through 
                                                 
1
 More than countries in Central America, except for Nicaragua. 
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different social programs such as the Bolsa Familia in Brazil and the program of bonos in Bolivia, as an effort 
to somewhat alleviate poverty through State controlled distribution of wealth. 
Bolivia, Venezuela and Nicaragua have the most outspoken governments and the ones more actively 
reforming the State to set course away from the neoliberal model and towards what they call the socialist 
paradigm or the new Latin American democracy. But they are not alone. The governments of Argentina, 
Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay also show varying degrees of ideological leaning towards socialism, 
ranging from actual policy design and implementation to simply political discourse. Brazil has a socialist party 
in government but shows restraint in their turn to the left and only Chile and Colombia have not shown yet any 
signs of following the same path, although Michelle Bachelet’s government in Chile did have a good rapport 
with the leftist governments of the surrounding countries and did express agreement with their positions and 
regional views. This reverted only after Piñera was elected president.  
Throughout South America, at least seven countries currently share ideological basis as to how to 
reshape and build the new Latin American State. They favor socially oriented policies, they have anti-neoliberal 
and anti-imperialist discourses; they display varying degrees of populist leanings supported by strong individual 
figures leading the process; they share a discourse of change and they prioritize society and politics over the 
economy (Barrett and Chavez 2008).   
But it is through these reforms and policies that governments question and weaken some values and 
principles that are central to democratic life, because the new Latin American States are adopting democratic 
means to achieve their goals, but are not equally subscribing to democratic principles. Whether it is 
disregarding the principle of alternation through Constitutional reform to extend the incumbent’s reelection 
opportunities as in Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina, or trying to restrict freedom of speech by introducing new 
laws, targeting and devaluating the press as president Correa did in Ecuador and Morales did in Bolivia; or 
effectively reverting the political system from a multi-party to a bi-party or single party system as occurs in 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina and Ecuador, where the opposition does not stand a real chance of 
winning and the effective number of parties is one or two.  
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Whether it is by governing through referenda and Executive Orders as happens in Bolivia and 
Venezuela, disregarding Congress and the representative structure, or weakening institutional stability and 
authority by setting reform as the main principle of rebuilding the State, making institutions and officials 
replaceable, exchangeable and expendable, governments of the new Latin American State use democratic 
procedures and rules instrumentally (some more than others), to gain power and strengthen political positions, 
picking and choosing which principles, values and procedures are important and which are dispensable, thus in 
the process undermining democracy itself. Nevertheless, the fact that these countries are still democracies is not 
contested, although they might be customized democracies that display a varying degree of democratic qualities, 
when compared to a model of modern western procedural democracy.  
Although Brazil and Uruguay have adopted some more socially oriented policies, their alignment with 
the New Left radical position is minimal, sharing a leaning towards social justice, redistribution and more State 
control over the market, but sticking to the rules of the democratic game.  
In the rest of the cases, the principles and values that “did not make the cut” in the building of the new 
Latin American democracies are held to be alien to the true Latin American cultural identity and the 
construction of the new Latin American State is already under way, dismissing what are deemed as western 
cultural traits –mainly economic and individualistic views- and replacing them by true Latin American cultural 
traits, whatever those may be. So, what are the new Latin American democracies like? And most importantly, 
how are citizens accommodating to the change?   
My dissertation takes a quantitative approach to understanding how citizens perceive the legitimacy of 
the State in Latin America within the context of the reforms and the political project of the New Left and it takes 
an in-depth look at Bolivia, as a case study, where the process of change has been ongoing since 2005 and is 
even more pronounced since the issuance of the new Constitution in 2009. Since then, the identity of the 
Bolivian State itself has changed profoundly begging the question of what the new democracy will bring for its 
citizens.  
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The analysis also includes the effect of the economic context in addition to the political context on the 
individual perceptions of legitimacy, since Latin America is one of the regions in the world with highest levels 
of economic inequality.  
This chapter introduces the main theoretical issues explored in my dissertation and discusses why 
legitimacy is especially critical as a study object for democracy at this historical point. In a second section, I 
describe the methods and data used to accomplish the study and finally I present a map of the organization of 
the document.  
Why legitimacy? 
Legitimacy holds democracies together. Without it, there may be the State, its institutions and 
authorities. There may also be laws and regulations, and even an orderly way of life; but without the trust and 
support of their citizens, democracies are not complete, for there is no relationship between the citizenry and 
the State, no sentiment of adherence that encourages citizens to uphold the rule of law, to live by democratic 
beliefs or to respect democratic principles. This is critical for a system that claims to be democratic because 
only in democracies are we concerned about people’s standings, opinions and perceptions.   
Therefore, the importance of the study of democratic legitimacy and what elements constitute its nature 
cannot be overstated, particularly when democratic values and principles are being questioned by the 
government and the institutions of the State.   
In political language, legitimacy refers directly to the State over other elements of political life. 
Legitimacy is an attribute of the State and depends on the population’s consensus regarding the validity of 
procedures, principles, norms and institutions of the political system expressed in the statement “This is why all 
power seeks to reach consensus, so that it is recognised as legitimate, transforming obedience in adhesion.” 
(Levi 1983:675) 
The importance of a system being perceived as legitimate by its citizenry has not only been pointed out 
by innumerable theorists and political scientists (Lipset 1959, 1961; Easton 1975, 1976; Miller 1974; 
Weatherford 1992), but the problems derived from a system with low legitimacy are a concern continually 
13 
 
reflected in the press and by politicians everywhere. In considering that “legitimacy involves the capacity of a 
political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate or proper ones for the society” (Lipset 1959) it becomes clearer that low levels of political 
legitimacy can undermine the political system in a manner that can put democracy at risk by means of the 
citizenry being dissatisfied with the appropriateness of the political institutions in place. It is through democratic 
institutions that the rules of the (democratic) game are established, carried out and consolidated over time.  
Political institutions embody and implement procedures and regulations of the regime and are the 
channel through which citizens relate to the State. In time, institutions determine the consolidation of the 
regime. The performance and efficacy of political institutions of the State and the government is a key element 
that nourishes the citizenry’s perceptions of political legitimacy of the democratic system (Weatherford 1987; 
Anderson and Guillory 1997; Cusack 1999; Offe 2006; Pierson 2006; Preuss 2006; Smith 2006).  
In turn, legitimacy derives from the support that the citizenry provides to the political system. It can be 
specific support –directed towards public officials and political leaders- or diffuse, directed rather to values and 
principles guiding the performance of the system. These constitute the basic structure of the political regime. 
Regime support “can adopt the shape of trust, defined as the feeling that one can count on the system to produce 
egalitarian results, or it can adopt the shape of legitimacy, defined as the personal conviction that the system 
adapts to moral and ethical principles about what is correct in the political sphere”  (Muller, Jukam et al. 1982) .   
In the early sixties Lipset had already identified the key role the legitimacy of the political system played 
in the survival of democracy. “A crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change. (..) Crises of legitimacy occur during 
a transition to a new social structure” (Lipset 1961). These changes may threaten the established institutional 
structure or may affect the access of majoritarian groups to the political system. They may affect even the very 
core principles, values and conceptions that individuals have about democracy and the democratic status of their 
political system.  
Academics have established that government performance has an effect on citizens and that it can have 
serious consequences when it is unsatisfactory.  Bastian and Luckham (2003) emphasize the need to study the 
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effects of democracies on the lives of citizens because democracy can generate negative and positive 
consequences, depending on the performance of political players, interest groups and economic conditions. 
Dissatisfaction with government performance can be changed into action at the individual level through system 
support. Political confidence plays a key role in the perception of legitimacy of norms and policies issued by a 
government, and therefore, it is key to the degree to which an individual is willing to support the government 
and the regime.  
Dalton’s (Dalton 2004) study on the erosion of system support in advanced industrialized democracies 
analyzes the factors that generate change in support for the system. Other studies (Easton 1976; Weatherford 
1992; Anderson and Guillory 1997) also provide evidence that individual assessment of government 
performance is one of the key factors that influence the level of system support and provide legitimacy to the 
system.  
Crises arise when conflicts escalate to the point of threatening the integrity of the system. It is again 
Lipset who points to the solution: “Since the existence of a moderate state of conflict is in fact another way of 
defining a legitimate democracy, it is not surprising that the principal factors determining such an optimum state 
are closely related to those which produce legitimacy viewed in terms of continuities of symbols and statuses” 
(Lipset 1961). Therefore, it is important to pay attention to the symbols, statuses, values, principles and 
perceptions of individuals during the process of change in order to see if the path of change is leading to a 
legitimate democratic system or to a democratic crisis.      
Many academics have been dedicated to the study of the effect of institutional change and reform and 
the consequences of institutional structures for the survival and quality of democracy. Anderson and Guillory, 
for example, focus on how distinct forms of institutions of representation affect citizens’ satisfaction with 
democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997); Lijphart focuses on institutional arrangements and their 
consequences for maintaining democratic rule (Lijphart 1990). In these and many other similar works, the 
driving question has been how institutions mediate citizens’ views of and relations with the state.  
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All of the research offers consistent support for the notion that institutions can have very real and 
powerful effects on a wide range of democratic outcomes and to the fact that the way citizens view their 
institutions and the general structure of the political system affect their adherence to or distancing from it.  
Institutional reform and experiments of change have long influenced the development and survival of 
democracies, but they can also get stuck in a seemingly never-ending transition period. For these countries, such 
as Bolivia seems to be, a question with increasing importance is whether the initial institutional choices made 
during the democratic transition have become obstacles in efforts to solidify and deepen democracy. What do 
we make, then, of those democracies that have, in many cases, undergone long processes of institutional reform 
and that have conducted series of institutional experiments but still suffer from weakening or persistent low 
legitimacy? Is their low political legitimacy a function of these continuous processes of change and institutional 
reform? 
Poverty and inequality can be seen by individuals as a failure of political performance in a way that goes 
beyond the government in place and can affect the system at its core, breaking the citizen – State relation and 
hurting its institutions (North 2005; Segura-Ubiergo 2007), which is many times expressed by the masses 
expelling presidents (as happened in Bolivia), closings of Supreme Courts (Ecuador) and Congress (Peru), 
discarding completely old institutional structures such as Constitutions and a “popular claim” to draft new 
constitutions.  
Low levels of political legitimacy are a constant concern in old and new democracies and are considered 
a threatening factor for the stability of democracies because they can cause political voids and weaken the Rule 
of Law. As Miller suggests, “Feelings of powerlessness and normlessness are very likely to be accompanied by 
hostility toward political and social leaders, the institutions of government and the regime as a whole” (Miller 
1974). 
Thus, citizens’ perception of the system as legitimate is crucial for its good performance and the 
consequences of a negative perception of political legitimacy has been expressed by several academics 
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(Rohrschneider 2006); Lipset 1959, 1961; Easton 1975, 1976; Miller 1974; Weatherford 1992; (Seligson and 
Booth 2009). 
Being an individual and subjective element, a product of perceptions, expectations and individual 
evaluations, political legitimacy is often constructed as trust and support to political institutions and other 
elements of the political system (Weatherford 1992; King 2000; Hetherington 2005; Blakelock 2006; Norris 
2006; Schwarz-Blum 2006; Rosanvallon 2008; Seligson and Booth 2009). 
In this context, public opinion and public opinion studies play a key role in the measurement of 
legitimacy because, ultimately, surveys provide us with a better way of assessing legitimacy since they draw 
data from the perception and evaluation citizens make about the performance of the democratic regime 
(Seligson and Booth 2009).  
Unstable and conflictive elements such as social unrest, dissatisfaction with governemental performance 
and limitation of political rights such as the right to disagree, participate and freedom of expression in political 
life and in the public sphere erode the degree of support that the democratic system requires in order to maintain 
its stability and can weaken the political system in general. Empirical evidence exists to show that individual 
evaluations of government and institutional performance is one of the key factors that provide legitimacy to the 
political system and affect the stability of the democratic regime. Evidence also points to the fact that a faulty or 
unsatisfactory institutional performance can have serious consequences on the legitimacy and stability of the 
regime (Lijphart 1990; Hadenius 1994; Cusack 1999; Ferejohn 2006), like what happened when Fujimori 
closed Congress in Peru, or the democratic crisis in Honduras in 2009, or the constant unrest in Bolivia up to 
2003 when Sanchez de Lozada had to flee the country and President Mesa resigned later leaving the country 
without a President.  
But it is not easy to identify factors that negatively affect the legitimacy of the democratic regime. 
Conflict is part of the political game and, according to democratic principles, is part of the political dynamic as 
much as any other element. And yet, conflict can escalate to the point that it threatens democratic stability, 
especially in low legitimacy regimes or in moments of change and reform.  
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Academics have persistently studied the impact of institutional changes and reforms on the quality and 
stability of democracy (Powell Jr 2000; Shapiro and Macedo 2000; Norris 2004; Wilsford 2005). One of the 
main issues is to understand how institutions act as mediators between citizens and state. One of the most 
frequent answers is that political institutions can exercise a powerful effect on a wide variety of democratic 
results and that individual perceptions of insitutions and the degree of trust they achieve affects the individual’s 
willingness to adhere to the regime or keep distant from it.   
On top of that, institutions do not perform in a void. The cultural, social, economic and political context 
influences institutional performance as well as individual perceptions about the regime (Torcal and Montero 
2006). For example, the undergoing crisis of the justice system in Bolivia, which included the closing of the 
Constitutional Tribunal for over a year and a paralyzed Supreme Court due to the resignation of magistrates and 
their judicial processing for corruption accusations would be unthinkable and damaging in a Western European 
country or in the United States, but did not cause uproar or even concern amongst the Bolivian population, with 
the exception of some voices from the private and the academic field, but did hurt the levels of trust for the 
entire judicial system and has not been able to recover yet. Unfortunately, most of the studies on the contextual 
effect have been carried out in developed and consolidated democracies in Europe (Anderson and Guillory 
1997; Norris 1999; Andersen and Heath 2003; Secor and O'Loughlin 2005; Wells and Krieckhaus 2006; 
Anderson and Singer 2008). 
Both the effect of the economic context measured through level two variables with aggregated data at 
the national and sub-national levels and the individual evaluation of economic performance of institutions on 
system support have been studied extensively with significant results that provide evidence to show that 
economic considerations are among the main considerations citizens take into account when evaluating the 
democratic regime and its legitimacy (Norris 1999; McMahon and Sinclair 2002; Dalton 2004; North 2005; 
Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Edwards 2010).  
Data from European countries shows evidence of an effective influence that a context of economic 
inequality has on shaping citizens’ views about the performance of the political system and on the level of trust 
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in political institutions (Anderson and Singer, 2008) contributing to the idea that what happens in the big picture 
affects behavior at the individual level. 
Nevertheless, only a few studies focus on the Latin American context (Schwarz-Blum 2008; NU, 
CEPAL et al. 2010). These show that the national economic context has real effects on legitimacy in the Latin 
American region and, moreover, effects that were not considered previously by the theory on the subject.  
Thus follows the assumption that the economic context is an especially important element for 
understanding the dynamics of legitimacy in a context of institutional reform and political change in Latin 
American countries because many of these countries are among the poorest in the world and poverty turns into a 
key problem, not only in the economic arena, but in the political one as well, since poverty brings inequality and 
inequality can lead to unequal access to political representation and unequal distribution of resources, eroding 
the legitimacy of the system in the eyes of those who do not get to be taken into account.   
Unfortunately, very little of this literature and empirical studies are concerned with the current Latin 
American political arena. There has been only little, if any, academic “follow-up” to the transition to democracy 
and its consolidation in Latin American countries; while the general agreement seems to be that these 
democracies are hardly consistent with the western model of democracy, evidence to support this claim focuses 
mostly on what these democracies seem to be producing (corruption and the resurgence of leftist political trends 
in the region, for example) instead of focusing on the actual structural foundations of democratic systems that 
are yielding troublesome products.  
With few exceptions, Latin America is a poor region, but more importantly, a region with enormous 
inequality in the distribution of wealth and income among the general population. Governments and politicians 
recognize poverty as a powerful destabilizing factor of political dynamics at the regional and national levels. 
Poverty generates inequality, not only in the economic field, but also in the access to opportunities and 
resources, to political representation and participation and even to justice. Combined, these elements generate 
profound dissatisfaction among the citizenry in situations related to the regime, its institutions, legitimacy and 
politics.   
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In many cases, dissatisfaction is correctly interpreted as failure in the economic performance of political 
institutions and can affect perceptions of institutional performance in other areas of political influence such as 
diversity recognition policies, access and distribution of territory, social welfare and others.     
Methodology 
In my dissertation I assert that institutions matter when it comes to the legitimacy of democracies in 
Latin America. I also argue that the perception of institutional reform and institutional performance are context 
dependent and that in order to understand how the perception of institutions relates to the legitimacy of 
democracies the specific domestic context in which institutions are performing needs to be taken into account, 
whether it is at the national or the sub-national level.  
My dissertation seeks to gather evidence to build on and expand aspects of the theory that it draws from 
and to strengthen the case of the institutional argument within the discussion of the causes and consequences of 
democratic legitimacy by testing theoretical assumptions in the Latin American and Caribbean regions, that 
have been coined based only on evidence from established democracies from industrialized western countries. 
The dominant view on this issue is that institutional performance and the perceptions about it are the central 
element determining legitimacy. But this view is based mostly on Western European and American cases, 
where States are much more stable and institutional structure has been in place for at least a couple of centuries, 
conditions that are not equaled by institutional structures in Latin American countries. Therefore, my 
dissertation will contribute by focusing on the Latin American case to explain how much weight perceptions 
about performance have on explaining legitimacy and what other elements also may be playing into it.   
It is so far unclear whether these theories will hold in emerging democracies. Were they not to hold, it 
would mean that academics are missing an important part of the democratic puzzle by disregarding the 
influence of the context –whether it be social, economic or other- on the workings of democracies.  
I have found that some of these theories and assumptions, when tested in a purely Latin American 
context, yield results that contradict what has been assumed so far for highly industrialized democracies 
(Schwarz-Blum, 2007). For example, I have found that amongst citizens of Latin American countries, both their 
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experience of the economic situation at the national level and their evaluation of their own economic situation 
matter when they decide to support or withdraw support from the State, whereas in more developed regions the 
evaluation of the personal economic situation does not matter as much as the national economic situation.  My 
research contributes importantly to furthering what we know about the dynamics of democratic legitimacy by 
paying special attention to the context in which democracies are established.  
Furthermore, I argue that both the institutional structure of democracies and the context in which it 
performs influence its perceived legitimacy on their own and when they interact. This last point brings to light a 
new approach to the old issue of the relation between the success of democracy and the environmental 
requisites aiding to its flourishing.  
I take this argument one step further by arguing that the influence of the economic context on 
democratic legitimacy –for which there is some rough evidence already- is a nuanced one, which can be better 
identified and understood when analyzed in interaction with the institutional structure of the State. The 
economic context is actually a result of the performance of governments in the economic field, which in my 
analysis includes GDP, level of human development measured trough the HDI and distribution of wealth, 
measured by the Gini Index.  
Part of testing the influence of the economic environment on democratic legitimacy is to explore the 
workings of this dynamic at different levels of analysis. I apply the same instruments applied to the cross-
country study to analyze how this dynamic works at the sub-national level.  
To this end I chose to take the case of Bolivia as a quantitative case study and explore how the variables 
interact in the stage of local politics in contrast to the cross-national study. Whereas there is wide variance 
across the nine Bolivian regions in regards to the economic contextual variable and acceptable variance in 
system support, the institutional variables will remain practically constant.  
In order to measure the effect of the economic context on legitimacy at the sub-national level, I hold the 
institutional variables constant, to account for the effect of different economic contexts on the perceived 
legitimacy of the democratic system. In this setting, the study of the dynamics of legitimacy at the sub-national 
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level is worthwhile pursuing from the theoretical and the empirical point of view, because since the election of 
President Morales in 2005 and since the beginning of the process of change, there has also been another change 
in regional political dynamics that I largely attribute to a fundamental cultural difference between two large 
sectors of the Bolivian population, which is expressed through two differing and almost opposing conceptions 
of the democratic model, the management of the economy and prospects of development. The body of literature 
on legitimacy can be significantly enriched with quantitative data analysis on the workings of legitimacy in 
regional politics arenas, which can open doors and paths to a different understanding of the legitimacy question 
altogether.  
The Nine Departamentos in the Sample 
Among the nine departamentos into which Bolivia is divided, there are important differences as to their 
level of economic development, distribution of natural and economic resources, institutional and administrative 
capacity, population distribution and political views and behaviors.  
Vargas V. established in a 2009 article that there are several clear economic differences between 
departamentos and that they can be grouped in macro-regions corresponding accurately to their political 
standing and economic projection. For example, Tarija, Pando, Santa Cruz and Beni register a “relative higher 
growth of the departmental GNP” between 1997 and 2006 (Vargas Villazón 2009) and again Tarija and Pando 
displayed the more active economic dynamic during that period. In addition to this, Oruro, La Paz and Potosi 
register a decrease of participation in national GNP as do Cochabamba and Chuquisaca for the same time 
period, while the Eastern macro-region (Oriente) registers an increase in national GNP participation and only 
Santa Cruz and Beni show a slight improvement in the net difference of HDI between 1992, 1995 and 2005 
(Vargas Villazón 2009). In all cases, the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando proved to have 
developed the most, both in economic and development terms while the other five, basically belonging to the 
western region of the country, proved to lag behind both in economic growth and development levels.  
The following table shows a summary of the main economic indicators for these variables updated up to 
2009, except for the HDI index not available for the departamento level after 2004.  
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Table I-1. Departmental differences in GNP, participation in GNP, GNP per capita and DHI. Source: INE and UNDP Bolivia. 
Departamento 
Participation in 
national GNP 
2009 (p), %  
GNP per capita 
2009 (p), in Bs.  
GNP 2009(p)  
in thousands of 
Bs. 
Dept. HDI 
(2004) 
La Paz 25.16 10,943 30,626,803 0.631 
Oruro 5.61 15,265 6,830,816 0.618 
Potosi 6.85 10,625 8,332,607 0.514 
Chuquisaca 4.49 8,531 5,466,642 0.563 
Cochabamba 15.24 10,167 18,545,544 0.627 
Tarija 11.61 27,717 14,127,458 0.641 
Santa Cruz 27.2 12,235 33,114,415 0.689 
Beni 2.95 8,215 3,595,380 0.639 
Pando 0.89 13,892 1,087,079 0.624 
 (p): projection 
 
These economic differences draw a sort of spatial map that establishes a persistent grouping of differing 
macro-regions in relation to their attitude towards the State and the political system; these differences determine 
differing political attitudes and behaviors of their citizens that determine the regional dynamics of democratic 
legitimacy in Bolivia. If these differences were to persist for a long period and were the State not to pay 
attention to these economic inequalities, it is the contention of this study that democratic stability may be 
threatened due to a growing domestic development gap.  
The aforementioned differences are also accompanied by a variation in the departmental levels of 
system support and institutional legitimacy as shown in the figures below.  
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Graph I-1. System support by departamento. Bolivia 2010. AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
 
 
 
Graph I-2. Legitimacy of political institutions by departamento. Bolivia 2010, AmericasBarometer by LAPOP.  
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With the exception of Oruro and Pando, the distribution of levels of system support and institutional 
legitimacy show grouping patterns between departamentos that are consistent with the groupings based on 
economic and development variation at the same level. The high levels of both variables in Oruro were not 
predictable based on its levels of GNP and percentage of participation in the national GNP, but could be 
influenced by its relatively high levels of HDI and GNP per capita. From this evidence, Oruro seems to be an 
atypical case that will be analyzed further.  
Regional configuration 
In recent years, and despite the last decade’s efforts to achieve administrative decentralization, Bolivian 
politics has been going through a process of emerging regional autonomy demands that are closely related to 
territorial political and economic projects that aim to boost regional development through the constitution of 
institutionally independent regional governments as a response to the ever growing centralism of the Morales 
government.  
In 1994, the Bolivian State initiated an enduring process of administrative decentralization based on the 
development of the municipal space as the territorial-administrative unit through which the central government 
channeled development efforts. Some fifteen years later, the decentralization effort –despite many successful 
experiences- proved to generate only a low degree of autonomous decision making to generate long lasting 
development projects beneficial for the regions. At the same time, the municipality, as the arena for the 
development of local politics dynamics, proved to be a space too small to respond to the aspirations of interest 
groups of all kinds.  
Thus, in the past five years new demands of autonomy have arisen
2
, this time taking the regional level 
(departamento) as the main geographic and administrative unit under the direction of an institutionally 
independent Regional Government (Prefectura) with capacity to manage their own economic resources, to 
                                                 
2
 At first as a civil demand channeled by the Comites Civicos in at least five of the departamentos and  later as a political demand 
channeled through political parties and organizations.  
25 
 
generate development projects with a regional scope and to organize their own political processes and 
configurations.  
In 2006, a national Referendum confirmed that at least 4 of the 9 regions
3
 agreed on the need to 
reorganize politics on the base of regional autonomies. This idea has acquired a strength that surpassed the 
centralizing will of the national government and later more regions started demanding autonomy as well (the 
case of Cochabamba). In 2010, for the first time, Bolivians elected Governors through direct vote. In addition to 
this, the regional arena has become a space for interest and social groups to reorganize politically and even a 
space able to reconfigure cultural regional identities.  
As a consequence, the dynamics of Bolivian politics has been playing out increasingly at the regional 
level, which has become more pivotal for national politics in recent years to the point that entire departamentos 
and even macro-regions
4
 have been confronting and questioning the national government on issues ranging 
from specific policies to the use of political influence and even to the –sometimes blatant- disregard for core 
democratic principles, rights and institutions.  
In view of this new configuration of the political game and the relevance of the regional level in 
Bolivian politics, this work examines the economic and political elements that explain democratic legitimacy –
measured in two different dimensions of the concept- at the sub-national level, based on public opinion data 
from the 2010 Americas Barometer Bolivian sample in attempting to understand the regional dynamics that 
determine the differences observed in the levels of system support and institutional legitimacy between 
departamentos.   
Aside of this, Bolivia is a valuable case to focus on because, together with Venezuela, it is the country in 
Latin America that has created, designed and implemented more policies and institutional reforms oriented by 
the New Left ideology and political style. Bolivia is one of the few countries that actually has issued a new 
Constitution and has effectively reshaped its State to put in practice these principles and ideologies. These 
                                                 
3
 The YES option won in the departamentos of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija. 
4
 The departamentos of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija and Chuquisaca (initially) conformed an alliance of Prefecturas, the “Consejo 
Nacional Democratico” (CONALDE) in order to negotiate with the national government, representing a broader region called the 
“Media Luna” by the media and the public. This name was given to the alliance due to the geographical shape formed by these regions 
on the map. They corresponded to all of the eastern and part of the southern regions of the country. 
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changes aim so deep that the new Constitution has even changed the base form of the political system and has 
moved from a Republic to the Plurinational State. Because all of this, Bolivia actually provides the ideal context 
to study citizens’ perceptions, views and assessment of the new Latin American State.  
 
The study of the democratic legitimacy in Bolivia and, in a comparative way, in the Latin American 
region contained in my dissertation is fully based on LAPOP data gathered during the 2010 round of public 
opinion surveys, with 3,018 cases. This source of data was selected for this study as the best alternative given 
the wide range of variables that make possible to study political legitimacy in more than one dimension and at 
various levels (supranational, national, sub-national) as well as it is possible to study the predictors of political 
legitimacy at the individual level.  
I chose to use the quantitative approach exclusively, taking advantage of the big N provided by public 
opinion surveys, because big N studies can bring clarity to seeing the big picture, especially when dealing with 
big picture issues such as democratic legitimacy and the effect contextual settings.  
I do not seek to find out or even define how citizens specifically and individually define as legitimacy, 
neither do I intend to redefine once more what legitimacy is, or for that matter what democracy means for 
individuals depending on their specific social, economic, political or cultural status. On the contrary, I depart 
from the assumption that despite personal preferences or beliefs, there is a general consensus about what 
democracy entails and about how legitimacy is perceived by the general public. There is also extensive 
literature and data supporting this assumption.   
Given the recent change in political context, the electoral success of the “New Left” and the wave of 
institutional reform throughout the region, Latin American democracies are ideal for testing the dynamics of 
democratic legitimacy from the perspective of the citizens, given the variance in levels of legitimacy across 
countries and in national economic conditions as well as the variance in degrees of economic inequality among 
countries.   
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On the political front, the current political trend in many Latin American countries, and  more so in 
South America, shows that citizens prefer populist, authoritarian “reformer/revolutionary”- type of leaders over 
the ones willing to stick to established institutional arrangements; citizens supported unconstitutional acts such 
as the closure of Congress in Peru during the Fujimori era, the closing of the Supreme Court and the 
replacement of Congress for a National Constitutional Assembly in Ecuador under President Correa, the closing 
and persecution of Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal in Bolivia under President Morales and the censorship 
of private press and organizations in Venezuela under President Chavez.  
These are only a few examples of how institutions are not only weakened but their importance 
completely dismissed currently in Latin American countries in which the legitimacy of established democracies 
is questioned by some of their own citizens and by outsiders.  
My analysis of the dynamics of democratic legitimacy and the effect of the economy is implemented at 
three levels:  
1. First, at the multi-national level, conducting analysis across 18 countries in the Americas (Mexico, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile), comparing them to each 
other in regards as to how the level of economic development and the institutional performance of democracies 
affect their perceived legitimacy. The dataset for this part of the study has 1,500 cases for each country and 
3,000 cases for Bolivia and Ecuador.  
2. I have conducted a case study in Bolivia, at the national level, providing a more in-depth view of the 
dynamics of democratic legitimacy based on two core elements: institutional trust and institutional performance, 
but also taking into account the effect of the economy at the individual level and as a context.  
I chose this country because the legitimacy levels have been traditionally low but experienced a 
significant increase in 2005 after a change in representation, after having undergone a series of institutional 
reforms in a context of poverty (Bolivia is the poorest country in South America). But I also chose Bolivia 
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because I have deep knowledge of its politics and its economy, as well as of its culture and idiosyncrasy of its 
people, which gives me an advantage at understanding perceptions and expressions of its citizens.   
3. Finally, I studied the dynamics of democratic legitimacy in Bolivia at the sub-national level, because not 
only is legitimacy not one-dimensional conceptually, but it responds to regional political and economic 
dynamics as well, adding more dimensions and layers to the construction of democratic legitimacy. For this 
purpose I used the Bolivian LAPOP sample, representative at the sub-national level, with nine strata, 300 cases 
for each of the six smaller departamentos and 400 cases for each of the three bigger departamentos in the 
country.    
The variation in levels of economic development (the contextual variable) within the country regions 
makes my analysis relevant and provides an innovative look at how local politics may affect the national levels 
of democratic legitimacy. 
In all cases, I have implemented multilevel models, because it allows accounting for the effect of context 
on individual behavior (Snijders and Bosker, 1999) and it also allows to account for the variability among 
individuals as well as among contexts. These models contain two types of data: data drawn at the individual 
level
5
 –representing the perceptions and attitudes of individual citizens- and national level data6 –aggregate data 
representing the economic context, both at the national and sub-national levels. This way of modeling the 
relations between the data better accounts for the difference in the type of the data and allows calculating more 
accurately the relations between variables. 
The dependent variable in all models is democratic legitimacy, measured at the individual level and 
defined following Lipset: “Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the 
belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” (Lipset 1959). 
Given that legitimacy is an affective and evaluative attitude it is measured at the individual level for such 
evaluation can only be provided by citizens, which are the ultimate recipients and enforcers of institutions. This 
                                                 
5
 Data for 18 Latin American countries from the 2010 round of public opinion surveys of the AmericasBarometer, by LAPOP.    
6
 These source of these data is the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) for each country in the region and also HDI indexes for the 
nine departamentos in Bolivia. Specific sources in each case are cited in the appropriate chapters. I have personally integrated these 
datasets into one pooled dataset for each case.  
29 
 
evaluation is made by the individuals by confronting their perception of the political system against their 
expectations of it, an appropriate measure given that legitimacy depends on the system engendering the belief 
that it is appropriate.  
Democratic legitimacy is operationalized as a variable measuring system support, following David 
Easton’s categorization. Easton describes system support as a multi-level evaluative concept that integrates 
three political objects: support for the political community, the regime and the authorities. All three levels 
combined account for the legitimacy of the system. The political community refers the extended social group 
within the borders of a nation, the regime is the constitutional order of a nation and the authorities are the public 
officials and people that hold office at any given time (Easton 1965). At the same time, support for the political 
regime is based on three elements: the regime principles, its norms and procedures and its institutions.  
 
Table I-2. Levels of system support. Table taken from Russel J. Dalton (Dalton 2004) 
Political community 
Regime: principles 
Regime: norms and procedures 
Regime: institutions 
Political authorities 
 
Given that individuals relate to the political system through institutions and that I am working within a 
moment of profound institutional reform through the region, I have further operationalized the dependent 
variable to work specifically at the level of support for the regime and divided it in two: 
a) System support: expressed as an index of five items that measure the level of support for all three 
dimensions of legitimacy that was developed by Professor Mitchell Seligson at the LAPOP project. 
The item is composed of the following questions:  
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Table I-3. Questions that form the system support index and levels of support to which they refer. 
Question Level of system 
support 
 To what extent do you think that the 
courts guarantee a fair trial?   
Regime: institutions 
 To what extent do you respect the political 
institutions of [country]?    
Regime: institutions 
 To what extent do you think citizen’s basic 
rights are well protected by the political 
system of [country]? 
Regime: principles 
 To what extent are you proud of living 
under the [country] political system? 
Political community 
 To what extent do you think the [country] 
political system should be supported? 
Political community 
 
 
These questions and the different levels of support that they refer to make a reliable index of system 
support that appropriately tackle the system’s ability to engender the belief that the institutions and norms in 
place are the best possible for the community and has the advantage of gathering first-hand data from the 
citizens that conform the political community under study.  
The underlying assumption here is that the higher the level of system support in a country, the more 
legitimate that political system is in the eyes of its citizens. The index has proven to be a reliable measure in 
numerous LAPOP reports
7
 on Latin American political culture and other works (Seligson 2002; Seligson and 
Carrión 2002).  
b) Legitimacy of political institutions: expressed as an index of five8 items that measure the level of 
support for the central institutions of the political regime.   
I have used both dependent variables in all chapters and they are defined in greater detail within those 
chapters.  
The following figure shows roughly how citizens in Latin American countries
9
 effectively differentiate 
between the three levels of system support and furthermore, how the support for the institutions of their regimes 
                                                 
7
 See the series of national reports on political culture for Latin American countries in www.lapopsurveys.org 
 
8
 In the Bolivian case, this index has 6 items, including the Electoral Organ, the newly appointed fourth branch of the Bolivian 
Plurinational State.  
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is the lowest when compared with the support for political community and for the regime principles. The 
“national pride” variable indicates support for political community; the ‘satisfaction with democracy” line 
represents support for the regime’s principles and the “system support” line represents what happens when 
institutions are thrown into the mix.  
 
Graph I-3. System support, satisfaction with democracy and support for political community.  
AmericasBarometer 2006 – 2007 
 
 Finally, throughout my dissertation I approach the measurement of democratic legitimacy through two 
of its dimensions: trust and the individual perceptions of institutional performance.  
Chapter 2 deals with the levels of trust that Bolivian citizens report on different individual and groups 
of institutions that are important to different aspects of democratic life, including institutions of representation, 
electoral institutions, the justice system, the police and the media. These are the focus of the first section of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
9
 Data for this figure is drawn from the 2006 – 2007 LAPOP sample including 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries.  
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work, since trust is at the very core of legitimacy building and institutions are the channel through which 
citizens relate with the State and the political system.  
The focus of my analysis are the regional configurations of trust in institutions in Bolivia (at the sub-
national level), since there is variance among departamentos in levels of trust and a macro regional 
configuration of trust that overlaps with political positioning of the departamentos seems apparent.  
This chapter shows just how complex the construction of democratic legitimacy can be, when all 
institutions –even those not directly dependent on the State and government- are expected to embody 
democratic values, beliefs and principles and what elements hinder or further trustworthiness. 
Chapter 3 explores the other face of democratic legitimacy. In a similar way to the previous chapter, 
regional configurations of legitimacy measured as the perception of institutional performance of the government 
in several areas of the public life are apparent in Bolivia and, many times, overlap national political 
configurations.  
This chapter stresses the point that individuals are very aware of the current process of change
10
 in 
Bolivia and takes into account both, economic and political conditions that influence and almost mediate the 
individual evaluations of governmental performance: the effect of the economic context and the effect of 
President Morales. The latter is measured through a variable evaluating the President’s personal performance 
and the effect is powerful.  
Thus the chapter shows that democratic legitimacy, measured in its performance dimension, is highly 
sensitive to political and economic settings and conditions in the national context.  
Chapter 4 tests the regional configurations of both, system support and legitimacy of political 
institutions at the sub-national level; it applies a mixed-effects model to measure the effect of the sub-national 
context for both variables, and it also analyzes the predictors of both variables individually in each of the nine 
departamentos in the country, providing deep insight into the regional dynamics of democratic legitimacy. The 
analysis also includes the effect of the sub-national economic context.  
                                                 
10
 This is the name that the wave of institutional reform and transformation of the Bolivian State has been given by the government 
itself and it is considered the main policy of State in the government’s program.  
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Strong evidence of regional configurations of both, system support and legitimacy of political 
institutions clearly arise from these analyses and the results indicate that, within the process of transformation of 
Bolivian democracy, a regional reconfiguration has taken place heavily influenced by the specific economic 
environment, but also by the political orientation and ideology of the departamentos.  
Chapter 5 takes the analysis into the supra-national level and tests the system support and legitimacy of 
political institutions variables in eighteen Latin American countries comparing the perceptions of citizens 
between countries.  
This chapter strongly focuses on the effect of the national economic context as aggregate data and at the 
individual level in order to establish its incidence as a determinant of system support and legitimacy, departing 
from the hypotheses that some level of economic development is necessary for democracies not only to flourish, 
but to be consolidated and that poverty and inequality hinder democracy. There is evidence confirming the 
relation between level of economic development and democratic legitimacy across countries, showing a 
tendency to see more developed countries, with better economic conditions with higher levels of democratic 
legitimacy.  
Finally, chapter 6 is a short concluding chapter that reflects on the combined meaning of all the results 
found in this work and their implications for both, the study of democratic legitimacy in a Latin American 
context and the paths of democratic legitimacy in the new Latin American State.   
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Chapter II . Regional Configurations of Institutional Trust in Bolivia  
 
The government of President Evo Morales inaugurated a new political period in Bolivian history. It is 
called the “process of change” and it has brought a charismatic leadership, the intention of a deep institutional 
transformation process and, apparently, the highest level of citizen satisfaction and support to the political 
system since the return to democracy.  
 The process of change is part of what is now called the new Latin American Left, an international 
movement that seeks, amongst other things, to transform Latin American democracies into political models that 
respond more appropriately to genuine Latin American interests and needs and that more appropriately 
accommodate cultural, economic and political conditions and priorities in Latin American societies.
11
  
The new Latin American democracies are conducting a successful social revolution with populist 
features, strong charismatic leadership figures and a partial embrace of democratic practices, mixed with the 
approval of extra-institutional resources and procedures to achieve the goals supported by a majority
12
.  
The new “Latin American State” draws democratic legitimacy from electoral outcomes. The greater the 
vote supporting the regime, the greater its legitimacy and popularity. But theory and evidence tell us that trust is 
the basis of legitimacy at the individual level and elections are one of the ways in which individual citizens 
express their trust and support.  
To assess what the sources of legitimacy are in Bolivia during the process of change it is necessary to 
study what Bolivians trust now and why. Whether Bolivian citizens display a generalized level of trust spread 
across a wide set of institutions and principles guiding democratic practices or if they are banking mainly on a 
strong leadership and a small group of preferred institutions to provide an accurate assessment of whence 
Bolivian democracy draws its legitimacy. 
                                                 
11
 As opposed to just implementing an Occidental model of democracy adopting sets of beliefs, values and priorities that do not 
necessarily feel genuine to Latin American citizens.  
12
 Bolivia provides a wide range of examples of these new features displayed by what I am calling the new Latin American democratic 
model: social protests and movements supported by the government, both financially and in public discourse; constitutional reforms 
passed by unconstitutional elections; using the Judicial branch to pressure the Legislative branch; seizing the direction of key 
institutions –formerly run independently from the powers of the State- such as the Electoral Court (today the Electoral Organ, the 
fourth branch of the Plurinational State) and the National Institute of Statistics, responsible for all official statistics of the Bolivian 
State.   
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This chapter will study the determinants of political trust in the currently highly personalized political 
environment in Bolivia to assess the strength of institutional arrangements and the influence of the charismatic 
leader figure across institutions and levels of political activity.  
The basis of trust 
Explaining how trust plays a role in the political process can be complicated. Scholars have always 
agreed on the importance of trust in the political process, the more citizens say they trust their government, the 
regime, the President and their institutions, the better. There has not always been agreement, though, about a 
proper definition of political trust, and definitions ranging from purely normative to philosophical to rather 
instrumental have been used over the years in research.  
The general take on political trust goes back to the 60s and 70s when the studies on political support and 
legitimacy of the regime done by David Easton, Seymour Martin Lipset, Phillip Converse, Jack Citrin and 
others were first known. Since then, the study of political trust is part of a broader study, that of political 
support and legitimacy of the regime.  
Enough evidence is available to view trust is both, a robust predictor and a proxy of system support and 
that the higher the levels of trust in political institutions, the higher the tendency to support the political system. 
Evidence of the existence of this same relationship in the Latin American context, and specifically in the 
Bolivian political context, is presented in the series of reports that the LAPOP program at Vanderbilt University 
has been producing periodically since 1998 under the direction of Professor Mitchell A. Seligson (Seligson 
1998; Seligson 1999; Seligson 2003; Seligson, Ames et al. 2004; Seligson, Schwarz-Blum et al. 2005).  
There is less agreement, though, when it comes to explaining why trust is such a positive feature of the political 
process and how it works (Dunn 1988; Good 1988; Luhmann 1988; Uslaner 2002; Hetherington 2005; 
Rosanvallon 2008). The importance of trust can be derived from the importance attributed to political support as 
an element of the political process, for a democratic political system cannot remain stable for long without the 
support of a majority of its citizens (Miller 1974; Herreros and Criado 2008). 
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  Since it is very unlikely that support can be present where trust is absent, trust has the same importance 
for the survival of the democratic regime than support does (Newton 2001). Simply said, the very perpetuation 
of the democratic system depends on a rather abstract element: support, based on trust.  
Mishler and Rose discuss extensively the importance of trust for the political system in the context of 
post-communist societies, and they argue that “popular trust in social and political institutions is vital to the 
consolidation of democracy” and furthermore that “trust is important (..) because it serves as the ‘creator of 
collective power’ enabling government to make decisions and commit resources without having to resort to 
coercion or obtain the specific approval of citizens for every decision” (Mishler and Rose 1997). Thus, political 
trust increases government’s efficacy and efficiency.   
Trust is important in democratic regimes because it is a key element of the representative relation 
between elected officials and the citizenry (Mishler and Rose 1997). If citizens would not trust their elected 
representatives, the decisions made by the latter would lack legitimacy and would therefore be hardly enforced. 
A model for measuring political legitimacy and empirical evidence of its importance in the representative 
dynamic of democratic regimes is presented in Stephen Weatherford’s analysis of the measurement of political 
legitimacy. In his work, Weatherford considers political trust as one of the key components of legitimacy 
(Weatherford 1992)
13
.  
The importance of trust is also evident in civil society, for it provides the basis for the creation of civil 
institutions such as labor unions, associations, committees and even political parties that are complementary to 
the political institutions and can increase their effectiveness (Mishler and Rose 1997). Trust encourages 
voluntary participation in politics, and through the creation of civil institutions, it provides citizens an 
alternative channel of participation in political life. 
David Easton’s distinction between specific and diffuse support (Easton 1975; Easton 1976) introduced 
the notion that support is not a one-dimensional element, but rather the product of a combination of different 
                                                 
13
 For a complementary discussion of political legitimacy see Lipset, S. M. (1961). Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics. 
Baltimore, MD., Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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evaluations of the political system and the performance of political authorities. Easton provides a clear 
explanation of how these two attitudes interact within the same political context:  
“Some types of evaluations are closely related to what the political authorities do and how they 
do it. Others are more fundamental in character because they are directed to basic aspects of the 
system. They represent more enduring bonds and thereby make it possible for members to 
oppose the incumbents of offices and yet retain respect for the offices themselves, for the way in 
for the community of which they are a part” ( which they are ordered, and Easton 1975).  
 
The same consideration has been made for the study of political trust, of how it is perceived and 
expressed and how it can be properly measured. Arthur Miller’s and Jack Citrin’s studies (Citrin 1974; Miller 
1974; Miller 1974) discuss the correlation of trust with measures of specific and diffuse support and separately 
provide empirical evidence to show that trust is a predictor of both types of support and that the consequences 
of trust in government are different from the consequences of trust in the political regime and therefore the need 
to address and measure them in a differentiated way.  
Studies of political trust tend to focus on trust in the government, in a specific political institution or in a 
specific element in the government. Studies addressing political trust in the regime are less frequent but have 
contributed greatly to the understanding of political trust and of the dynamics of legitimacy in democratic 
regimes
14
. Studies of specific political trust are more common among mainstream studies since they tend to be 
part of the study of a specific institution or instance of the political process and probably because studies of 
diffuse trust seem less attractive in contexts in which the democratic regime is rather stable and is safely 
expected to remain so.  
The nature of political trust can be defined more as an attitude rather than a behavior for it is the result 
of a passive evaluation of the performance of political objects in relation to the expectation of their performance 
that does not necessarily yield an action as a consequence (Easton 1965; Easton 1975). Trust plays a key role in 
the perception of the legitimacy of a government or regime’s rulings and therefore of the level of support an 
                                                 
14
 For an example of studies that focus on diffuse political trust refer to the series of LAPOP studies in eleven Central and South 
American countries, especially during the 90s and the beginning of the 2000s. LAPOP studies have a battery of questions about 
institutional trust that provide a good measure of diffuse political trust in each country and can provide a comparative perspective 
between countries. Data and reports can be found in www.lapopsurveys.org  
38 
 
individual may express to the regime and the government (Newton 2001; Avery 2009); however, support is 
likely to translate into an action while the level of trust provides part of the justification of that action.  
Taking into consideration what has been discussed so far about the nature of political trust as a concept 
and how it is studied, Hetherington’s definition of political trust as “the degree to which people perceive that 
government is producing outcomes consistent with their expectations” (Damico, Conway et al. 2000; 
Hetherington 2005:9) is useful because it introduces the idea of trust as a result of a comparison between 
people’s perceptions and their expectations, thus combining an empirical dimension with a normative one.    
Using this definition of trust as an inspiration and for the purposes of analysis in this paper, we will 
define political trust as the degree to which people perceive that the political process is structured in a way 
consistent with their expectations (Hardin 2000; Newton and Norris 2000). This definition calls for a 
measurement of political trust as institutional trust, for institutions are the long-lasting elements of a regime and 
are evaluated independently of the incumbents. This concept of political trust focused on the institutions should 
allow us to measure diffuse political trust and provide us with an idea of the level of satisfaction with the 
democratic regime that is going to be tested in the Bolivian political context.  
This chapter is concerned with understanding the determining factors of political and institutional trust 
seeking to understand what citizens take into consideration when evaluating their perceptions of political 
objects and comparing them with their expectations. These criteria are unlikely to be universal across political 
systems and will rather vary according to the specific socioeconomic characteristics of political communities. It 
is even possible that they vary across social groups within the same political unity and should therefore be 
studied in connection with specific political contexts.  
Political trust is not homogeneous but rather unevenly distributed for different institutions or 
institutional settings. For different sets of policies, it may be considered differently among men and women, 
young or older people; it can vary across income groups and people with different levels of educations, 
according to where people live and to their ethnic affiliation (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974; Seligson 1980; 
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Abramson and Finifter 1981; Seligson 1998; Seligson 1999; Citrin 2002; Moore 2002; Seligson, Morales et al. 
2004; Hetherington 2005; Seligson, Schwarz-Blum et al. 2005).  
Methodology of the analysis  
This chapter aims to determine predictors of political trust in Bolivia. The secondary goal is to uncover 
regional configurations of trust, if there are any to be found, that will provide information on how political trust 
and democratic legitimacy may be distributed among the population along territorial lines.  
This is a relevant level of analysis because territorial jurisdiction mostly overlaps with cultural 
groupings in Bolivian society, and therefore it is reasonable to expect variation in values and beliefs (that will 
determine predictors of trust) across regional borders. Of course, this variation is not expected to present radical 
differences among regional groups, for they all still belong to the same national community and will therefore 
display a set of shared values together with a set of values that vary across regions.  
The models of analysis used in this chapter include a variety of population demographic characteristics 
(age, sex, wealth, etc.) as well as a series of economic and political considerations together with more 
contextual elements, all of which together are expected to predict levels of political trust for a specific group.  
All models share a core of independent variables (demographic characteristics), but display a set of 
field-specific independent variables for each institution that are expected to have an effect on specific 
institutions. Other contextual variables, such as the weight of the President’s popularity or discrimination issues, 
are expected to be significant across fields and are included in all models for all institutions.  
All analysis models are multilevel mixed-effects regressions run at the national level but defining the 
departamento as the grouping variable with an expected fixed effect, measured by a series of dummies for each 
departamento in the country. In the cases in which regional patterns of political trust are found, additional 
regression models will be run at the sub-national level to further understand what predicts trust in each region of 
the country.   
The index of institutional legitimacy combines measurements of trust in five central institutions of the 
democratic regime: the national government, Congress, the Supreme Court, the judicial system and the political 
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parties. This set of institutions represents the Executive, Legislative and the Judicial as well as the channeling 
institution for representation and participation of the citizenry in political life. Each of these powers relies on 
institutions that play a vital role in the functioning of the democratic regime and that are the means for citizens 
to relate to the State.  
Results  
 The data displayed in Table II.1 shows the mean averages of support by departamento for five central 
institutions of the political system, covering the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government. 
Additionally, political parties have been added to the index of institutional legitimacy, given that they are the 
link between the citizenry and their elected candidates, as well as the channel to access national, regional and 
local levels of decision making.  
 
Table II.1. Means of trust in the institutions that form the index of institutional legitimacy. Bolivia 2010. Source: 
AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
 National 
government 
Legislative 
Assembly 
Supreme 
Court 
Judicial 
system 
Political 
Parties 
La Paz 60.12 51.44 44.80 40.96 29.90 
Oruro 65.36 54.74 51.06 47.80 40.86 
Potosi 63.04 49.46 45.73 40.63 23.37 
Cochabamba 55.47 52.69 41.73 40.60 29.60 
Tarija 52.96 53.61 50.88 46.14 39.32 
Chuquisaca 48.88 43.93 41.91 41.91 34.31 
Santa Cruz 51.51 54.04 48.62 46.69 37.92 
Beni 46.67 48.31 48.73 46.61 40.76 
Pando 51.43 50.65 34.53 35.54 32.37 
  
Not surprisingly, levels of trust in political parties in Bolivia are very low, but so it is in the entire world. 
It may be that an additional element in the Bolivian context that contributes to low levels of trust in political 
parties is the fact that Bolivia is constitutionally defined as a participative democracy and the citizenry is 
encouraged to participate in politics as much and at as many levels as possible. Political parties are not the only 
channel available for participation, even in national politics.   
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Finally, the new Latin American democratic model promotes a culture of distrust towards representative 
policy, and political parties are identified as the instrument of monopoly and dominance of the traditional elites.  
From the means of trust displayed in Table II.1, there are no regional configurations of political trust 
evident for either all five institutions in the institutional legitimacy index or for regions comprising 2 or more 
departamentos. The only discernible pattern is that the highest levels of trust across the board are in the region 
of Oruro, highly supportive of the President, as has been repeatedly confirmed in electoral processes.  
As for the average mean of trust for institutions in the system support index
15
, the only discernible 
pattern is that trust is lowest in the region of Chuquisaca in 80% of the cases.  This is an especially troubling 
result, since this means that the principles underlying the democratic system are at stake here and that 
Chuquisaca may be the furthest away from considering Bolivian democracy legitimate.  
All regression models run for predictors of trust for individual institutions yield a positive result for a 
fixed effect at the sub-national level. There is variation of trust levels for all institutions analyzed in this chapter 
by departamento, even when there are no macro-regional groupings that define a trend by macro regions. This 
means that the internal political and economic dynamics of the departamento mark a specific trend of political 
trust for each one of the nine regions in the country creating a national scenario of high complexity in terms of 
political trust. 
Trust in institutions of the Executive: the national government 
 The only case in which a clear macro-regional configuration of political trust is discernible is found for 
trust in the national government, clearly defined along political alignment in Bolivia.   
                                                 
15
 Measured as trust in the guarantee of a free trial, in support for both the political system and its institutions, as pride in belonging to 
the political system and trust in the protection and guarantee of basic citizen rights.  
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Graph II-1. Trust in the national government, by departamento. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
 
 Trust in national government in 2010 remains the lowest in the eastern macro-region, in Beni, Pando and 
Santa Cruz, the traditional opposition to President Morales’ government since his first term election in 2005. 
Together with this group, low levels of trust in Chuquisaca and Tarija also respond to macro-region political 
alignment, with all five regions making up what was known as the “media luna” region, the active opposition to 
the process of change.  
Although political polarization and active opposition have reduced during President Morales’ second 
term (and after the issuance of the new Constitution), the trend of distrust in national government in these 
departmentos has not reverted and trust has not improved significantly.  
Trust in national government is highest in Oruro and higher than in the media luna region in all 
departamentos with higher electoral results in favor of President Morales’ party.  
Levels of trust in institutions in the system support index and the institutional legitimacy index are 
consistently lowest in Chuquisaca and Pando, both regions that have systematically had confrontations and 
46.7
51.0 51.5
52.8 53.6
57.7
60.8
63.1
65.9
0
20
40
60
80
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
Beni Santa Cruz Pando Chuquisaca Tarija Cochabamba La Paz Potosí Oruro
95% CI
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
43 
 
serious social and political conflicts with the national government, while trust is consistently highest in Oruro, 
already a traditional supporter of President Morales and the process of change.  
All in all, variation in trust –for both system support and institutional legitimacy indexes- between the 
lowest and the highest ranking regions are not higher than 10 points on a 100-point scale, which indicates an 
overall relatively stable level of political trust in the country.  
Trust in institutions of justice: the case of the justice system 
The Judicial branch of government has been through a trust crisis since the beginning of the process of 
change. The President’s active campaign to discredit the Bolivian justice system, closing of the Constitutional 
Tribunal (for over three years) and public discredit of several magistrates of the Supreme Court has only added 
to the already existing distrust and dissatisfaction with the performance of the judicial system in Bolivia. 
Over time, trust in the institutions of the Judicial branch has significantly decreased, even trust in 
communitarian justice, which is not yet considered an official institution of the State and has no links to the 
overall structure of the Judicial branch or justice system in Bolivia. Communitarian justice obeys customary 
laws and practices exclusively in rural areas and indigenous population.  
What the results seem to be showing is a pattern of trust that is starting to revert to levels of trust prior to 
Evo Morales’ election in 2005. After his inauguration, trust in institutions was boosted across institutional areas 
due to a generalized state of optimism and high expectation of the change the new government promised, with a 
Constitutional reform process on the way and with the promise of an important turn in the direction of social 
policy in the country.  
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Graph II-2.Trust in institutions of the Judicial branch. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP.  
 
 But the fact that even trust in communitarian justice has decreased between 2008 and 2010 reveals a 
renewed and generalized distrust in justice administration in Bolivia and maybe even in the belief that justice is 
one of the core elements of democracy. More importantly, it reveals that the optimist period and high 
expectations of what the new Bolivian State would bring was short lived. In fact, this result is very surprising in 
the light of the last Constitutional reform from 2009, in which communitarian justice was acknowledged as part 
of the formal justice system in Bolivia for the first time in history, although it is still unclear how it will be 
worked in with the rest of judicial institutions and procedures.  
 Predictors of trust in four institutions acting within the field of justice administration in Bolivia are 
detailed in Table II.2, below. Results of the mixed-effects regression model indicate that there is an effect at the 
regional level on all four of the institutions analyzed in relation to administration of justice in Bolivia and that 
variation between regions is statistically significant, even when no evident macro-regional configuration is 
defined for political trust in judicial institutions.  
  
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
T
ru
s
t 
a
v
e
ra
g
e
2004 2006 2008 2010
Supreme Court
Justice system 
Communitarian justice
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
45 
 
 
Table II-1. Predictors of trust in institutions of the Judicial branch. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 Supreme 
Court 
Justice 
system 
Trust in 
tribunals 
Communitarian 
Justice 
Sex   .148** .149* 
Age  -.0053**  -.0071** 
Education    -.99 (.1) 
Wealth .63**    
Urban/rural .1599*    
Indigenous self id. .2253**    
Interpersonal trust .0023*    
Perception of corruption -.0054** -.0043** -.0039** -.0042** 
Gvt. Performance: rights .0212** .0183** .0102** .0177** 
President’s approval .0045**   .0089** 
Discrimination  -.0015** -.0034** .0017** 
Perceived degree of democracy   .0044**  
     
N 2,346 2,296 2,188 2,272 
 
 Two common elements for all four institutions are reliable predictors of trust in judicial institutions in 
Bolivia: the perceived level of corruption will harm trust in justice institutions, even the individual basic trust in 
the guarantee of a free trial. The higher the level of perceived corruption, the less citizens will trust the justice 
field, whether it works through official or unofficial channels
16
.   
 Although it may seem that this is a logical outcome, the negative effect of the perception of corruption is 
not a synonym of distrust, for corruption is not the only source of distrust in an institution
17
. In fact, in settings 
with a high degree of inefficiency and low performance, as has always been the case of Bolivian justice, 
corruption sometimes acts as an unofficial channel to achieve what would be made difficult through official 
channels. In Bolivia, some degree of corruption is accepted as a way to help navigate the bureaucratic process, 
not only in the judicial field, but in all institutions in the public sphere; citizens do not evaluate corruption 
comparing it with a baseline of zero corruption, but rather their baseline is some existing and accepted level of 
                                                 
16
 Communitarian justice has always been considered an “unofficial” institution, not recognized by the Constitution and not regulated 
by any Bolivian State Law. The status of communitarian justice has changed since the issuance of the new Constitution, in which it is 
recognized to have the same validity as any other justice institution to make decisions and impose punishments. Regulations on how 
the communitarian justice system will interact with the official justice system and how it is going to be regulated are still pending.  
17
 People distrust public officials because traditionally, parties have rewarded their members by distributing public positions in return 
for their support during electoral processes, making more them loyal to the party and its policies in the first place, and before their 
commitment to upholding the law and performing efficiently. In other words, since traditionally being a public servant is mostly not a 
career but a short-term opportunity in Bolivian politics, public officials view their relationship to their party as their priority, rather 
than their relationship to the citizen or the institution. 
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corruption and  my hypothesis is that it becomes a negative element only when it exceeds the degree of what is 
considered to be the “normal share” of corruption in institutions. Hence, a significant and negative effect of the 
perception of corruption on institutional trust is showing that citizens perceive corruption beyond what they are 
already used to.  
On the other hand, good governmental performance in the protection and promotion of democratic rights 
will boost trust in justice institutions. This positive relation to all four institutions in the justice field confirms 
the strong link between the idea and the practice of justice and the core principles guiding democracy.  
Gender and age are also predictors of trust. Younger people are more trusting of the justice system and 
communitarian justice than older groups, as are women who are distrustful of the guarantee of a free trial and 
communitarian justice when compared to men.  
 
 
Graph II-3. Trust in justice institutions based on experience of discrimination. Bolivia 2010.  
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
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 A revealing but not surprising result is how the experience of discrimination significantly generates 
distrust in the justice system. The more discriminated an individual has been (has felt), the less trusting of the 
justice system he will be.  
 Bolivia still ranks as the country with the highest levels of discrimination in the Americas
18
, and access 
to justice has traditionally been mediated by ethnicity, economic standing and education level. The anti-racism 
and discrimination Law passed in 2010 has helped reduce discrimination, especially against indigenous people, 
but the effect cannot be estimated yet because it is a very recent law.  
Results in Graph II.3 clearly indicate how the communitarian justice system is viewed as a separate and 
alternative field for justice administration. People who have suffered discrimination will trust the 
communitarian justice system more and turn to it to seek justice, moving away from the official justice system 
and the Supreme Court.  
Discrimination in Bolivia affects some specific social groups more intensely: the indigenous, women 
and people living in rural areas or from rural extraction even if they live in big cities. In large portions of the 
national population these three sources of discrimination overlap in the same individual or group of individuals, 
intensifying the effect of discrimination in vast sectors of the population.  It is precisely these groups that will 
find communitarian justice not only more accessible in geographic terms but also in cultural terms, since it is 
based on traditional views on justice.  
Additionally, the Bolivian justice system has historically alienated quechua-speaking populations, 
because all forms and procedures are in Spanish and because of the financial costs. The implications of this is 
what is in place in Bolivia right now, a parallel justice system, a fractured understanding of what constitutes 
justice and a large portion of population that is deeply distrusting of the formal justice system, thus causing a 
historically determined weakness of the institutional justice frame, which among others may have consequences 
that affect the strength of the rule of law.  
                                                 
18
 According to data from the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer public opinion survey.  
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Among the justice institutions, solely the levels of trust in the Supreme Court are affected by individual 
wealth and geographic location. Wealthier people living in urban areas trust the Supreme Court more than 
poorer people in rural areas.  
Indigenous people are also more trusting of the Supreme Court than non indigenous population. There is 
a high probability that this outcome is connected to the fact that the higher the approval of the President’s 
performance, the higher the trust in the Supreme Court will be, since the Supreme Court has lost independence 
(and magistrates) and fallen under an unofficial control of the Executive.  
Since the implementation of the 2010 round, judicial elections were held in 2011 in Bolivia. For the first 
time in history, Bolivians have been able to elect judges directly to all levels of courts and jurisdictions. The 
election procedure and the designation of candidates was highly conflictive and turnout was lower than 
expected. Further data will be useful in assessing whether this change of procedure has improved trust in the 
justice system.  
Trust in institutions of representation: the Plurinational Legislative Assembly 
Trust in the Legislative Assembly
19
 has consistently increased over time, close to 20 points in the 100-
point scale between 2004 and 2010.  
Governmental performance is a strong predictor of trust in this institution across a wide range of 
political and economic activity areas: in the protection of democratic principles, the reduction of poverty, 
unemployment and corruption and the reduction of criminality. 
Ethnicity has become an important predictor of trust since the beginning of the process of change, in 
2005 and even before that. President Morales rose to the national political scene from a social movement of 
peasants and indigenous people. Before MAS, the peasant and indigenous social movement IPSP
20
 transformed 
into a political party under the leadership of Evo Morales and had a significant effect on the indigenous 
                                                 
19
 See regression results in the Annex section.  
20
 Instrumento por la Soberanía del Pueblo 
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situation and the political role of indigenous people as well as in the role of the indigenous and peasant 
movements.  
Morales initially run on a platform for the defense of indigenous rights and the validation of the national 
predominant indigenous identity, thus forming a very strong link between his political role and the indigenous 
people.   
The 1994 Ley de Participación Popular decentralized the Bolivian State and opened the local arena for 
political inclusion, which increased indigenous involvement in the political arena, reduced abstentionism and 
promoted participation. More importantly it generated a feeling of being represented, which reached such a vast 
sector of the population that it achieved electoral victory at the national level through Evo Morales for the first 
time in history. Undoubtedly, this is a powerful connection between the indigenous population and their only 
successful representative which carries to this day vast amounts of support for him and his project, even though 
in his second term Morales and MAS have sought to broaden their social basis to include urban populations that 
identify as mestizos and have somewhat moved away from their initial indigenous identity.  
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Graph II-4.Trust in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly by ethnic identification. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer 
by LAPOP. 
 
Graph II.4 illustrates the increasing gap of trust in this institution between the indigenous and non 
indigenous population in Bolivia, although levels of trust have consistently increased even among the non 
indigenous population.  
Approval of the President’s performance exercises a strong influence over trust in this institution, 
meaning that his popularity benefits the general perception of the Legislative, too.  
On top of this, a perceived high degree of democracy at work increases the levels of trust in the 
Legislative Assembly and so does a high level of political tolerance, whereas a high level of perceived 
corruption (spread among public officials) decreases trust in this institution. 
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Trust in institutions of representation: the case of elections 
Electoral processes have become central to building of legitimacy in Bolivia. The new Constitution has 
transformed the Electoral Court into the Electoral Organ, the fourth branch of the Bolivian Plurinational State, 
emphasizing the importance of the role that elections play in the democratic system. The official public 
discourse constantly reminds citizens that votes legitimize authorities, policies and institutions.  
 
Graph II-5.Trust in elections, by region. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
  
Results of the mixed effects regression model
21
 for trust in elections show a significant effect of the sub-
national level in defining variations of trust across the national territory. Graph II.5 illustrates the distribution of 
trust in elections among sub-national units.  
 Elections are more trusted in Oruro and Cochabamba, traditionally the two regions with consistently 
higher vote rate in favor of the President, his party and his policies
22
. Conversely, trust in this institution is 
lowest in the regions that are clearly at odds with governmental policies and procedures: Chuquisaca, Beni, 
                                                 
21
 See regression results in the Annex section. 
22
 Both regions voted NO in the autonomy referendum.  
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Pando and Santa Cruz where political positioning has affected the general level of trust that elections (as an 
institution) had constructed in the years since the return to democracy.  
 MAS supporters are more trusting of electoral processes than those who did not vote for MAS, and 
individuals with higher levels of political tolerance are also more trusting of this institution. In light of this 
result, it is interesting that the President’s approval does not have a significant effect when it comes to 
determining levels of trust in elections, which can be interpreted as a level of independence retained by this 
institution that stands for itself even when it has officially become the center of the fourth branch of 
government.   
Trust in political parties –albeit very low across all regions when compared with other institutions- will 
still positively influence trust in elections. 
A good performance by the government in regards to promoting and protecting democratic principles, of 
which elections are among the most important, will increase levels of trust in elections and their outcomes.  
Satisfaction with overall democratic performance of the political system also increases levels of trust in 
elections, and the higher the perceived degree of democracy, the higher trust in electoral processes will also be, 
as shown in Graph II.6, below.  
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Graph II-6.Trust in elections based on degree of perceived democracy. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
 
 This strong level of influence of democracy’s presence and performance in the political system and the 
extent to which democratic principles are protected show how closely elections are linked to be the 
quintessential expression of democracy in the minds of Bolivian citizens. This could also be interpreted to mean 
that the regularity and permanence of electoral processes are an equivalent of the existence and permanence of 
democracy in the country.  
 Trust in regional institutions: Gobernaciones (Regional governments) 
 In the past five years, since the first direct election of regional authorities, the Bolivian main political 
arena has been somewhat divided between the national and the regional level. Gobernaciones play a pivotal role 
in aggregating and promoting regional interests and projects, especially for regions that are not politically 
aligned with the central government.  
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 Mixed-effects regression results show a positive fixed effect at the sub national level when determining 
levels of trust for Gobernaciones, emphasizing the growing importance of regional political and economic 
dynamics in Bolivian democracy.  
 
Graph II-7. Approval of regional autonomies. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
 Trust in these institutions is closely related to the idea and restructuring of Bolivian geopolitics 
sanctioned by the new Constitution, where departmental autonomies are created and each region has a 
Departmental Legislative Assembly
23
 with competence to create departmental laws, especially regarding 
regional development and economic projects.  
 A very clear macro-regional configuration is evident in regards to variations in level of trust in 
Gobernaciones and regional autonomies. Approval of regional autonomies is highest in the eastern region of the 
country (Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija) which shares the liberal development and economic ideology of a 
modernized conception of procedural democracy and is therefore in disagreement with the Plurinational State 
                                                 
23
 Representatives to the Departmental Legislative Assembly are also elected by direct vote. 
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democratic project. The level of trust and support for the idea of reshaping regional politics through the 
consolidation of regional autonomies very strongly influences the level of trust in Gobernaciones.  
 Institutional performance is the strongest predictor of trust in Gobernaciones. The higher the approval of 
governmental performance in economic and social areas, the higher the level of trust in the Gobernación will 
be. In the same way, the higher the level of satisfaction with overall democratic performance nationwide, the 
higher the trust in these institutions.  
Nevertheless, a performance variable with a negative effect on trust in regional governments is the 
approval of the performance of the President. The higher the approval of the President’s performance is, the 
lower the level of trust in regional governments.  
This result has a very clear political explanation. Before the recognition of regional autonomies by the 
new Constitution, the President was openly and strongly opposed to their creation. Regional autonomy was the 
banner of the opposition (the media luna) and the issue was settled in a binding referendum, in which the vote 
for approval of regional autonomies won in the media luna departamentos and lost in the rest of the country.  
Since then, the President has changed his public positioning about regional autonomies, but they have 
affected his trend of political centralization of decision making in the hands of the national government. Hence, 
the higher the proximity to the President’s position and approval of his policies, the lower trust in regional 
governments will be.   
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Graph II-8. Trust in Regional Government by level of education. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
 The individual level of education has a strong negative effect on trust in the Gobernaciones. The higher 
individuals go through the education system, the less they will trust these institutions. This effect is important 
since the difference between those with no education at all and those with university level education is over 10 
points in the 100-point scale.  
Another demographic characteristic of individuals that has a bearing on levels of trust in regional 
government is ethnic identity. Indigenous populations will tend to trust Gobernaciones more than non 
indigenous population.  
This result reflects the highly regionalized current dynamics of the political in Bolivia. Ethnic groups 
and roots vary between macro-regions. The eastern region of the country has indigenous populations from a 
wide diversity of ethnic roots, but since their numbers are small and their political weight little, they are 
organized together and present a united political front as “eastern indigenous peoples.” On the other hand, 
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Quechuas and Aymaras also have their organizations and are much more closely linked to the government and 
the State than the eastern indigenous peoples.  
Therefore, when indigenousness increases the level of trust in Gobernaciones, they trust their own 
regional institution more, and not necessarily the institution itself. More clearly, it is highly unlikely that 
indigenous peoples in Beni will trust the Gobernación of Oruro more than the non indigenous population of this 
region, but indigenous people trust regional governments more than those who do not consider themselves 
indigenous within the same region, probably because with a feeling of being represented by a government 
focused on social justice and indigenous identity they also sense a better opportunity to be included in the 
regional dynamics of politics.  
Trust in local institutions: local governments 
Between 2008 and 2010, trust in local governments significantly decreased nationwide. Somewhat 
relegated as the central sub-national political arena, the local space competes for political importance with the 
regional space and although the local space is the closer and more accessible political scenario for political 
participation, corruption scandals and inefficiency have reduced support for these institutions.  
And, it is precisely performance and perception of corruption that significantly affect levels of trust in 
these institutions. The overall index of governmental efficacy and the specific approval of services provided by 
local governments have a positive effect on trust. That is, the better institutional performance, both at the 
national and local levels, the higher trust in local governments will be.  
On the contrary, the wider the perceived spread of corruption amongst public officials
24
, the lower trust 
in local governments will be.   
A macro-regional configuration of trust is identifiable in the distribution of trust in local governments in 
the country, as is shown in Graph II.9.  
                                                 
24
 Municipal workers and officials have some of the worst reputations when it comes to corruption in the country.  
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Graph II-9. Trust in local governments, by region. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
Mixed effects regression results confirm the fixed effect of the sub-national level in determining trust in 
municipalities across the country, reproducing the influence of the regional political and economic dynamics 
seen for the case of regional governments in the local arena, too.  
Trust for local governments is higher in the political “non-aligned” regions of Tarija, Beni and Santa 
Cruz. The explanation for this distribution of trust lies in the political struggle in which autonomous regions and 
national government are currently involved. In the midst of this struggle, regional and local governments are 
very important political pieces to gather support and adherence from the general population to the regional or 
national economic and political project.  
Therefore, it follows logically that a strong predictor of trust in local governments is the level of 
adherence and approval of the idea of regional autonomies, which exercises the same effect on local 
governments that it does on Gobernaciones.  
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Graph II-10.Trust in local governments based on approval of regional autonomies. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer 
by LAPOP 
 
Because of this, local governments increase in importance precisely in those regions that are trying to 
win space and influence against a very popular and powerful central government.  
Trust in the police 
The police, together with political parties, are traditionally the institutions with lowest levels of trust in 
Bolivia. Although there is a positive fixed effect of the sub-national level on the distribution of trust for the 
police, no regional or macro-regional configurations can be identified in the case of this institution.  
Among the predictors of trust in the police, the individual level of education has a negative effect on 
trusting the police. Citizens with higher levels of education will trust the police less than individuals with a 
basic or no education.   
The perception of corruption practices amongst public officials will also negatively affect trust in this 
institution. The wider citizens believe corruption practices have spread, the less they will trust the police.  
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Graph II-11.Trust in the police, based on discrimination and feeling of insecurity. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer 
by LAPOP. 
 
As is shown in Graph II.11, the perception of insecurity and the experience of discrimination in different 
scenarios also reduce trust in the police. The more individuals have been discriminated against, the less they 
will trust the police while at the same time, the less safe individuals feel in their immediate environment (their 
neighborhood or community), the less trust for the police they will have, since it ultimately falls to the police to 
fight criminality and keep neighborhoods and communities safe.   
These results paint a grim picture of hopelessness for citizens, especially in high criminality areas, for 
instead of turning to the police for protection and safety, the more dangerous the environment, the less people 
trust the police.  
This is the only case of all the institutions analyzed in this chapter where most of the predictors in the 
model have a negative effect on the levels of trust in the institution. In this case, only the approval of the 
President’s performance and ethnic identification as indigenous have a positive effect on the levels of trust in 
the police.  
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This combination of Presidential approval and indigenousness can be interpreted as a sort of joint effect 
of a political element by which the majoritarian indigenous population in the country (the Quechua) feel closest 
to the President’s policies and priorities and therefore are more willing to trust the government, the system and 
the institutions all across the board.  
Trust in the media 
The last institution studied in this chapter is the media. The role of the media in society is to be a source 
of independent information and to provide the opportunity and stage for debate, dialogue and exchange of ideas. 
But it also oversees the political game and exposes irregularities and conflicts. Independence of the media is 
crucial for them to perform their tasks adequately.  
As with many other previous institutions analyzed in this chapter, levels of trust in the media are 
regionally determined at the departamento level, and variations of distribution of trust in this institution are 
positively determined by regional political and economic dynamics.  
As is shown in Graph II.12, a clear macro-regional pattern appears also –as in several other cases 
before- when it comes to trust in the media.  
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Graph II-12.Trust in the media, by region. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
Trust in the media is higher in Santa Cruz, Tarija and Beni, all three part of the “media luna” region, 
identified with the opposition to the Morales’ presidency. This configuration clearly results from political 
positions and alignments, in which the regional media have very actively taken part in not having maintained 
distance or independence from the political events in their corresponding regions unlike the “official media,” 
which has taken the side of the government.  
Younger people tend to be more trusting of the media than older citizens and in general, residents of 
urban areas trust this institution more than residents in rural areas.  
In general, good performance of the government in the management of the economy and the promotion 
and protection of democratic principles will have a positive influence on trust in the media.   
Additionally, individuals that have an optimistic view of the national economic situation will trust the 
media less than people with a pessimistic evaluation of the economy. This strange relation can be explained by 
the fact that there has been a struggle between official and independent sources concerning the economic 
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performance of the government and the real extent to which the international economic crisis of 2009 has 
affected Bolivia.  
This struggle has been played out through the media and positions have been taken. The disagreement 
was never settled, and the citizenry was left with the choice of taking positions, too. Those who are closer to the 
President and his policies believe in the optimistic economic outlook the government presents. Hence, the better 
the evaluation of the national economic situation, the less citizens trust the media.  
 
Graph II-13. Trust in the Media by discrimination and year. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
 
 
 The experience of discrimination has a negative effect on trust in the media, as Graph II.13 illustrates. 
The more scenarios in which a person has felt discriminated against, the less people will trust the media.  
As strange as this relation may seem, it makes sense when in context. Most television stations, 
newspapers and radio stations are privately owned in Bolivia. The State owns one television station and 
publishes an official newspaper with very low circulation. In Bolivia, the media is owned by the economically 
powerful and have traditionally been used to further social and political networks and support the elites. Even 
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during the authoritarian period and after that, in the return to democracy, the Bolivian media have always been 
politically positioned.  
People who suffer discrimination usually do not belong to the dominant class and will actually distrust 
anything that is channeled through privately owned media and identify these institutions as biased.  
Conclusions 
Although the Constitutional reform was expected to increase the legitimacy of the Plurinational State by 
becoming the foundational base for the building of the new Bolivian democracy, the immediate reaction to it 
has not achieved to increase citizens’ trust in the newly reformed institutional frame.  
The case of trust in institutions of the judicial system is a good example of this. One of the reforms of 
the Constitution included the popular election of magistrates of the superior Courts for the first time in Bolivian 
history. These elections were held in April 2011, and ever since, institutions of the Judicial have continued to 
lose trust according to LAPOP data for 2012, with the exception of communitarian justice, which after a four 
year period of losing trust has become the only institution of the Judicial to gain trust, basically due to its being 
the most accessible of justice institutions for the common citizen (Moreno Morales, Schwarz Bum et al. 2012). 
Still, it remains unknown how communitarian justice will be integrated in the formal justice system and how 
communitarian justice procedures - which vary from region to region - will be regulated and acknowledged by 
civil and penal codes.  
President Evo Morales is the leading figure of the process of change, the face and the voice of the new 
left project in Bolivia and he is also carrying most of the weight of the legitimacy of the institutional setting of 
the Plurinational State. The State draws much of its legitimacy from him, or at least the perception of his 
performance is determinant in citizens’ evaluations to trust or not to trust institutions.  
Of course this has negative implication for the new State, for its stability and the support of the system 
are highly dependent on the presence of one figure, rather than on the strength of its institutional structure. This 
also means that there are no institutionalization efforts underway although public discourse reinforces the idea 
institutions of the Plurinational State are strong, stable and trustable.  
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The case of Chuquisaca and the low levels of trust and support for institutions is a good example of the 
vulnerability of a State depending so much on an individual figure, rather than on institutionalized structures. 
Although initially supportive of the Morales government during his first term, Chuquisaca has shown a quick 
turnaround in four years, due to their confrontation with the President because of a case of severe discrimination 
against indigenous people and a confrontation between urban and rural population. Since the events of 2009, 
they have been practically “under attack” from the national government despite having a MAS regional 
government, with regional authorities involved in litigations against the State.  
Additionally, when it comes to trust and support for institutions, a clear regional configuration shows. 
This configuration has more to do with disagreements between regions and the national government on a 
national project than with actual economic conditions and institutional performance across regions. 
Nevertheless, disagreements on the national project are strongly linked to economic views of development and 
also on issues of regional identity. 
As for an evaluation of the reception of institutional reform, the process of change and the 
implementation of new left ideology and policies, citizens do not seem optimistic. Trust and support have more 
to do with partisanship measured by individual assessments of Presidential performance, ideological tendencies, 
support for the individual figure of the leader and regional loyalties than with the strength or authority of 
institutions themselves.  
In the next chapter I will study the effect of institutional performance of the national government on 
issues that are central for improving quality of life that are also closely related to the upholding and promoting 
of core democratic principles, such as the protection of citizens’ rights, security, alleviation of poverty, 
redistribution of wealth and justice administration. All of these are tested within the context of institutional 
reforms and settings implemented by President Morales’ program - called the process of change - , as an 
expression of the Bolivian version of New Left ideology.    
   
66 
 
Chapter III . Regional Configuration of Legitimacy and System Support Based on Governmental 
Performance  
 
 
Some Latin American democracies are changing. The new Latin American democracy is being crafted 
by the new Latin American left and Bolivia is not only at the very center of this movement (Edwards 2010) but 
also one of the countries that has invested the most in actually rebuilding the State and the political system to 
carry out New Left ideology as a national project. The movement, although being implemented from above, 
enjoys ample support from the citizenry, as shown by electoral outcomes since 2005, and encourages citizen 
participation at all possible levels of political decision-making.  
Participation legitimizes decisions. And legitimacy is one of the most important concerns for 
governments of the new democracies. Legitimacy and support for the new system are therefore obtained mainly 
through electoral processes (presidential elections, judicial elections, referendums, public consultations), and 
electoral results yield automatic legitimacy to policies, decisions and reforms (Norris 2004).  
But elections are not the only source of legitimacy and are not the only determinant of support. 
Performance is also an important source of legitimacy and support for the system, an element often overlooked 
in the process of transforming the State and democracy and justified because it is the price of transition and 
change (Grindle 2000; Moe 2006).  
How citizens feel about this part left aside and how it affects system support and political legitimacy is 
nonetheless a real concern with potentially harmful effects for the general stability of the new democracies in 
the long run and with high costs for society in the shorter term.  
This chapter studies the effect of individual citizen evaluations of institutional performance in Bolivia in 
the midst of the process of change, on support for the democratic system and on the general legitimacy of its 
political institutions in an attempt to assess the relative importance assigned by Bolivian citizens to 
institutionalization versus a personalization trend in the political process in the construction of the Bolivian 
Plurinational democratic State.  
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Legitimacy and the Bolivian Process of Change 
Constitutional reform and social policy changes are the instruments chosen to transform what used to be 
the Bolivian Republic into the Plurinational State of Bolivia. At least, that is President Morales’ public 
statement and the instruments expressed in his general plan to implement the process of change.  
With a government elected in 2005 by a clear majority, the process of change has targeted existing 
political institutions as the first stage of required transformation to lead the way into the “social State,” shaped 
with clear populist features such as a highly popular leader, a clearly individualistic style of politics at all levels 
and a clear predominance of “majority” will over concern for minority rights.   
Political legitimacy and support for the political system have improved significantly since the election of 
President Morales and his plans for change in Bolivia seven years ago, and “legitimacy” of policies and reforms 
has repeatedly been confirmed by electoral results in several occasions since then. 
Bolivia's new Constitution took effect in 2009, and it reformed the State in basic areas such as the 
addition of a fourth branch, the Electoral Organ, to accompany the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches 
of the State. More importantly, the new Constitution recognizes the right and autonomy of indigenous nations, 
qualifies the Bolivian democratic system as a participative democracy
25
 and acknowledges the right of 
indigenous peoples to live according to their traditional and customary practices and laws within their territorial 
jurisdiction.   
Health and education institutions have not been transformed, nor has the economic sector, except for the 
nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, which is now under the exclusive operation of the Bolivian 
Plurinational State.  
Official statistics report that poverty numbers are decreasing since the beginning of the process of 
change and that Bolivia has been unaffected by the general economic crisis of 2009, reporting a steady trend of 
economic growth and inflation in single figures. This success, together with the social concern of the State and 
                                                 
25
 As opposite to a representative type of democracy, although the representative system has not been replaced but rather 
complemented by the increase of channels and opportunities for participation in decision making.  
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the social orientation of public policy, yields automatic legitimacy to the government and the system. Or so they 
say.  
Yet, the process of change and Morales’ government rely primarily on a type of charismatic legitimacy 
following Weber’s typology, a legitimacy derived from the presence and authority of a charismatic leadership, 
not uncommon in populist regimes, and based on a highly personalized political practice. Performance of the 
government also plays a role, for some policies are popular amongst the population, like the distribution of 
wealth program that basically relies on government issued payments for pregnant women, to keep children in 
schools and for elderly citizens (bonos) which are one a year payments of small amounts directly delivered to 
disadvantaged groups.  
But there is little official or unofficial information available to allow a real assessment of the economic 
efficacy of these bonos. Public access to official information such as the yearly amounts being distributed or 
studies about how these funds are invested by recipients is very limited. In fact, government agencies either do 
not conduct these studies or they do not make public the results even when citizens request access to 
information regarding the use of these public funds. Therefore, only very little privately and highly speculative 
data is available to assess government performance in these areas.  
What the general consensus
26
 understands nowadays as legitimacy corresponds to Weber’s second type 
of legitimacy, the legal-realist type, which is given by the individual citizen to a set of “impersonal institutions,” 
whose authority and competence are defined by the Constitution. This type of legitimacy is accepted as a more 
“desirable” setting for modern democracies, or at least as the desirable goal for consolidating or developing 
democracies.   
Whether the process of change has achieved this common ideal understanding of a legitimate democracy 
is a concern in Bolivia given the great popularity of the President, his policies and his ruling style. But, if 
legitimacy and support obey popularity and a charismatic quality rather than a rational-practical quality of 
                                                 
26
 The general consensus among academics, politicians and citizens in general in the westernized world considers the occidental model 
of democracy, a highly institutionalized democratic system, in which the stability and strength of the process of decision making is 
more important than the character and permanence of the people in charge of decision making institutions.  
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legitimacy, then the stability of the democratic system in the long run is guaranteed only insofar as the President 
keeps winning elections and as far as the Constitution allows him to run for reelection.  
This chapter will analyze how important considerations of institutional performance are for Bolivian 
citizens when assessing the legitimacy of political institutions and their support for the democratic system.  
The analysis focuses special attention on the performance of institutions regarding economic issues and 
will assess whether economic considerations at the individual level and aggregate level (by departamento) still 
remain important in determining political legitimacy and system support when taking into account the effect of 
institutional performance and the popularity of the President. 
Methodology of the analysis  
The analysis uses a mixed effects model regression to assess the influence of institutional performance 
on both system support and institutional legitimacy in Bolivia using data from the 2010 round of the public 
opinion survey conducted by the AmericasBarometer. 
The first model includes variables of institutional performance in the form of a combined efficacy index 
that takes into account governmental performance in economic and political areas: fight against poverty, 
unemployment and corruption, improvement of citizen security and promotion and protection of democratic 
principles. This index measures areas of governmental action in the field of public policies that affects citizens 
in their everyday life.  
A factorial analysis of this index indicates it is highly reliable, with all five components lying mainly on 
one factor and with a reliability index of .9224 (Cronbach’s alpha).  
The model also includes performance variables at the local level (individual evaluation of services 
provided by the local government) and the approval of the President’s performance.27 A variable measuring the 
Representative’s performance in Congress was originally included in the model, but it is not significant, thus 
strengthening the charismatic leadership hypothesis, since other important authority and leadership institutions 
                                                 
27
 The question directly asks the individual to assess how well the President performs its duties.  
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and figures, such as legislators do not have any real effect on people’s evaluations on the legitimacy of the 
political system.    
Additional variables are included as indicators of bad performance in two areas: an increased perception 
of generalization of corruption practices among public officials is an indicator of bad performance in reducing 
corruption, and an increased perception of insecurity is an indicator of bad performance in reducing criminality.  
The second model measures the same elements, but disaggregating the efficacy index and measuring the 
importance of institutional performance individually in order to assess which areas of performance are more 
important to the citizenry. This model has an added performance variable measuring the evaluation of 
government management of the national economy.  
Then, the same model is run at the sub-national level, given the diversity of positioning by 
departamento, both economically (affects evaluation of economic policy) and politically (affects strength of the 
influence of presidential popularity). 
The importance of the sub-national analysis of the data lies in the potential to uncover regional 
configurations of system support and institutional legitimacy due to differing economic and political regional 
positioning, which has proven relevant in analysis conducted in previous chapters and which plays a role in the 
stability and strength of the process of change and the construction of the Bolivian Plurinational State.  
This analysis also has the potential to uncover a probable regional configuration of support and 
legitimacy that would differentiate the Bolivian population along the line of adherence to charismatic or legal-
rational considerations of democratic legitimacy.  
The results of both models are shown in Table III.1, below, and are analyzed in detail in the following 
section.  
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Table III-1. Mixed effects regression model for system support and institutional legitimacy. Bolivia 2010.  
Source: AmericasBaromenter by LAPOP. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 System 
support 
Institutional 
Legitimacy 
System 
support 
Institutional 
Legitimacy 
Efficacy of the 
government 
.4005** .4861**   
Fights poverty    .0417* .06807** 
Promotes democratic 
principles 
  .0816** .09643** 
Fights corruption   .04966** .08292** 
Improves security   .0911** .08347** 
Fights unemployment   .0616** .06751** 
Handles the economy   .09144** .1031** 
Local government services .0662** .06188** .06347** .06549** 
Approval of the 
President’s performance 
.08813** .06284** .0701** .04548** 
Perception of corruption  -.0352**  -.0372** 
Perception of insecurity  -.02237*  -.03033* 
N 2,383 2,388 2,306 2,304 
     
* sig. <.005 
** sig. < 01 
 
 
The mixed effects model also included initially an analysis of the effect of time (between 2004 and 
2010), but no significant results were found. The question is could a “time-effect” of performance be reasonably 
expected to influence levels of system support and institutional legitimacy? The answer is yes if one considers 
an effect of a process of institutionalization that strengthens and improves institutional processes and overall 
performance, especially if independence and efficiency is gained through institutionalization. From this 
perspective, performance does not depend on the individuals leading and working in these institutions, but 
individuals should accommodate to them.  
In the Bolivian case, no time effect is found on how institutional performance influences levels of 
system support and institutional legitimacy. This can be interpreted as a sign of a still highly individualistic 
political process being in place. In fact, a “personalistic” style of practicing politics has been on the rise since 
the beginning of the process of change, and it has encouraged the existence of a highly dependent and 
inefficient body of political institutions.  
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Moreover, the significant effect of Presidential approval on assessment of institutional performance 
across all the measured areas confirm the assumption that citizens view institutional performance - 
independently from the area in which institutions perform- as a direct result of the role of the President whether 
it is his influence or his policies, rather than as solely or mainly as a result of efficient institutions. But this 
result can also be interpreted as a proxy for partisanship, for individuals who approve of the President also 
approve of how the institutions perform by way of loyalty and as a vote of confidence rather than by sheer 
evaluation of institutional performance.  
Results 
Graph III.1, below, shows the general average of perception for six variables of institutional 
performance in the fields of reducing poverty, unemployment and corruption, improving security, management 
of the national economy and promotion and protection of democratic principles.  
In general, averages are slightly above the medium point of the 100 point scale, except for governmental 
performance in reducing criminality (or improving the feeling of security in one’s neighborhood or community) 
and reducing unemployment.  
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Graph III-1. Averages of government performance. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
 Between 2008 and 2010 there has been no significant change in citizens’ perceptions of how the 
government and the process of change deal with criminality and are successful in creating jobs for Bolivians, 
and these have remained as the most-contested areas of government action during the process of change. 
The government’s efficacy in reducing poverty28 in the country receives the most positive rating from 
citizens. Much the same happens with the evaluation of how much the government promotes and protects 
democratic principles. Although the average for 2010 is the second highest for the series and it reports a level of 
satisfaction with performance in this area, the average has not improved since 2008 and is lower than the 
recorded average for 2006.  
In both cases, citizens express that the process of change has not improved its performance in these two 
areas since its beginning, but that in fact performance has worsened.  
                                                 
28
 President Morales’ government has put in place a set of “wealth redistribution” public policies in the form of bonuses paid to the 
poor and those in need in society. Bonuses are paid with profits from the hydrocarbon production area and are distributed as monthly 
payments to the elderly (although this bonus was created during Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s second term  when was named the 
“solidarity bonus”), and as yearly payments for families with children enrolled in the public school system, as an incentive to keep 
children in school. Another one-time bonus is paid to mothers with newly born children, in addition to the universal maternity health 
insurance which covers pre and post natal care for mother and child until the child’s second year (the universal insurance was also 
created by Sanchez de Lozada’s government). Amounts paid out are in the range of Us$ 20 to 30.  
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This is very clear in the case of reducing corruption practices. The 2010 evaluation average of 
government performance on this issue is significantly lower than in 2008 and both are lower than the average 
registered for 2006, indicating a clear decline in the perception of how the government and its policies are 
unsuccessful in reducing corruption.  
On the contrary, the average evaluation of services provided by local governments in 2010 is higher than 
in 2006 and 2004 but has not improved in the time between 2008 and 2010.  
Finally, the general approval of the President’s performance has increased significantly between 2008 
and 2010, reaching its highest point since President Morales’ election, with an average of 61 points in a 100-
point scale. This is a clear sign of the personalistic style of practicing politics in the process of change, in which 
the salient figure of the President overpowers the presence and actual performance of political institutions and 
policies.  
Results from the analysis at the sub-national level indicate that considerations of institutional 
performance are relevant in determining levels of system support at this level, too, as is illustrated in Graph 
III.2
29
. The graph shows that in all cases, evaluations of institutional performance matter for determining system 
support levels and that the better institutions perform the higher system support will be, although with 
intensities varying across departamentos. This variation in intensity indicates that institutional performance is 
not the only element determining system support and that the different economic and political contexts 
introduced in the model by the regional dummies also play a role in determining system support at the sub-
national level.  
                                                 
29
 See same fitted values for institutional legitimacy in the Annex section.  
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Graph III-2. Fitted values for system support based on efficacy of the government’s performance. 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
The slopes of the lines in the graph are less steep for four departamentos Beni, Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz 
and Potosi and these are perfect examples of how context influences an otherwise clear effect of institutional 
performance on system support. Both economic and political contextual elements are at play in all four 
departamentos. Beni, Chuquisaca and Potosi are amongst the poorer regions in Bolivia, while Santa Cruz, Beni 
and Chuquisaca are additionally the regions with more political conflicts and confrontations with the national 
government and with President Morales.  
Given that the figure of President Morales is key to determine evaluation of institutional performance, a 
problematic relationship to him and the national government shows in lessening the importance of institutional 
performance when determining system support in these regions. In the case of Potosi and Beni, a poor economic 
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performance of the national government
30
 and its economic policies are also influencing the region’s adherence 
to the political system.  
Although the weight of institutional performance varies from region to region, the data show that 
individual evaluations are important for Bolivian citizens across the country, thus indicating that, while a 
charismatic leadership is a strong determinant of democratic legitimacy, citizens do not undervalue the 
importance of the existence and importance of institutions and their role in the system.  
Table III.2, below, summarizes the mean of evaluation of institutional performance in all of the six areas 
analyzed at the sub-national level.  
 
Table III-2. Means of institutional performance by departamento. 
 Fights 
poverty 
Promotes 
democratic 
principles 
Fights 
corruption 
Improves 
security 
Fights 
unemployment 
Handles 
the 
economy 
La Paz 59.68 57.07 56.25 51.17 50.84 57.89 
Oruro  68.08 63.45 60.34 55.87 54.02 60.69 
Potosi 57.09 53.70 55.94 47.79 46.74 54.85 
Cochabamba  56.07 52.59 51.04 47.37 47.99 50.98 
Chuquisaca  56.85 51.03 50.96 49.54 47.62 47.50 
Tarija 53.43 50.90 53.51 50.28 48.34 50.33 
Santa Cruz 50.25 48.59 47.61 43.43 43.53 47.85 
Beni  45.19 42.21 44.33 41.81 41.39 43.12 
Pando 50.12 48.87 52.71 47.97 47.03 45.31 
 
The institutional performance evaluation results by departamento clearly show the diversity of 
perceptions of the Bolivian citizenry depending on the region where they live. The lowest scores for each 
variable are shadowed in red, indicating the first glimpse of a regional configuration in which the poorest 
evaluations –or conversely, the highest dissatisfaction- is concentrated in the eastern departamentos Santa Cruz, 
Beni and Pando and to some extent in Chuquisaca.  
                                                 
30
 Low economic investment in regional development, lack of support for export policies for local production and open political 
confrontation with regional authorities (in Beni). Potosi also has complaints about the economic performance, for the local population 
had higher expectations of nationalization of mines and mining industries in the departamento. In 2011 there was a confrontation 
between miners’ cooperatives and the national government, when miners occupied private mines and demanded the government 
nationalize them and “delivered” them to the control of the workers. After months of conflict, the government yielded and the mines 
in question were nationalized and are currently under control of private cooperatives.  
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These departamentos are the core of what was known as “the media luna” during President Morales’ 
first term, during which political polarization was very high and the media luna carried a staunch opposition to 
the process of change and its policies. This opposition was based mainly on the divergence of economic and 
political policy goals, with economic growth and development and institutional independence and efficiency 
being the main concern of the eastern region of the country while the government prioritized social policy and 
cultural recognition even at the expense of economic growth
31
.  
Although polarization has decreased significantly, the disagreement on the understanding of how 
democracy should work and on the national economic model has not. Therefore, a clear regional configuration 
appears at the moment of determining levels of support for the system and evaluating the level of legitimacy of 
the political institutions, since they do not equally respond to appropriateness expectations from citizens across 
the country.  
The departamentos in the “media luna” region rate the institutional performance of the national 
government consistently lower across all areas of policy than the rest of the regions in the country. This is a 
clear effect of the regional political context, because it reflects a disagreement with national policies and with 
the President himself on a national project and the model of democracy. It is not necessarily that the President 
does not have electoral support in these departamentos, but despite a fair amount of supporters, regional identity 
also plays a role in the manner in which citizens of these regions view and evaluate the national government and 
regional identity is strongly based on the role of opposition.  
Averages of institutional performance evaluation by region also confirm the centrality of partisanship - 
as support for the President, not necessarily support for MAS - that I discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
Departamentos with higher rates of support for President Morales consistently rate institutional performance 
higher than departamentos with lower levels of support for the President. 
The cases of Cochabamba, Potosi and Chuquisaca are special cases when it comes to rating institutional 
performance on fighting unemployment, which population in these regions rate lower for economic reasons. All 
                                                 
31
 There were of course discrimination and racism issues involved as well as a clear elite replacement process that was strongly 
resented in the eastern departamentos.   
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three departamentos have slow economic dynamics: Potosi is trying to revive the mining industry, Chuquisaca 
has no real local industry aside of some small factories and lives mainly from public employment (Sucre is the 
seat of the Judicial Organ) and Cochabamba also lacks local industry, living mainly from the services sector and 
unfortunately surviving by a constant capital flow of drug trafficking, although there are no official sources to 
confirm this information.   
 
Graph III-3. Government performance: fight against poverty. Bolivia 2010. 
Source: America Barometer by LAPOP 
  
Graph III.3 strengthens the idea of a regional configuration in the individual evaluation of institutional 
performance wherein political and economic factors are at play. While Pando and Beni rank amongst the 
regions with lowest GNP, Santa Cruz is the richest region in the country; however, low levels of satisfaction 
with institutional performance will lower the levels of support and legitimacy perceived by their citizens, 
although they were traditionally regions with high levels of both support and legitimacy. Undoubtedly, the 
political factor plays a role again in the case of Santa Cruz, and despite its wealth, its political position will 
cause perceived levels of legitimacy to drop. 
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To balance out this situation, high levels of approval for institutional performance of local and regional 
governments (the Gobernación) improve the general perception of institutional legitimacy in these areas.  
In the rest of the country a general higher level of approval of the performance of political institutions 
consistently across the entire series of institutional performance is registered, in some cases displaying 
enormous differences such as in the case of the fight against poverty in which Beni’s evaluation is 23 points 
lower than that of citizens living in Oruro. 
Oruro is the top ranking region in all cases, with the highest approval level of institutional performance 
and higher levels of system support and institutional legitimacy. Despite being the sixth-ranking region by 
GNP, the political factor is strong in this region, and since the beginning of the process of change it has been 
consistently the most supportive region for the President, especially amongst the rural population.  
Graph III.4 further confirms the existence of a regional configuration in institutional performance 
evaluation, this time in a purely economic policy field. Although the difference between the lowest and highest 
evaluations is only 17 points on a 100-point scale, the same regions display the same attitude towards 
institutional performance as to how the government manages the national economy.  
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Graph III-4. Government performance: management of the economy. Bolivia 2010. 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
 Approval of national economic policies is lowest in the eastern region of the country, including 
Chuquisaca in this group, while the rest of the regions qualify these policies above the medium point of the 
scale.  
 The same configuration can be observed for the other variables measuring institutional performance by 
the government, thus indicating a clear divergence of understandings of how democracy should work in regards 
to the policy fields analyzed in this chapter.  
 The following section analyzes the results of linear regressions for the effect of institutional performance 
at the national, regional and local levels on system support and legitimacy by departamento (individually). The 
goal of this analysis is to understand the regional dynamics of both levels of democratic legitimacy within each 
departamento and identify specific determinants of both, system support and institutional legitimacy, based on 
perceptions of institutional performance.  
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Table III-3. Regression results for the effect of institutional performance on system support and institutional legitimacy, by departamento.  
Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
 
*sig. <.005 
** sig. <.000 
 
Indep. 
variables 
Dependent variables 
La Paz Oruro Potosí Cochabamba Chuquisaca Tarija Santa Cruz Beni Pando 
Sys  Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg 
Fights poverty   .143*         .139*    .231* .290* .435** 
Promotes 
democratic 
principles 
  .154* .180*       .129*  .181** .188**     
Fights 
corruption 
   .121*  .146*  .150* .091*      .135*    
Improves 
security 
       .099*   .133*  .131** .168** .177*  .205*  
Fights 
unemployment 
.128*     .090* .214**     .147*       
Handles 
economy 
.143*  .111* .136*  .125*  .104* .107* .116*  .150*       
Local gov. 
services  
.100*          .149* .148* .091* .096*   .180**  
President 
approval 
  .148*     .096*  .161* .130*        
Perception of 
corruption 
           -.117*   -.083*   -.159* 
Perception of 
insecurity 
-.061* -.059*      -.057*   -.071*  -.058*    -.117*  
                   
R-squared .374 .471 .3948 .4428 .2579 .3791 .2806 .4781 .2319 .2626 .5644 .6082 .4208 .4975 .4113 .4465 .6798 .5938 
                   
N 331 331 241 242 265 263 314 315 224 222 233 234 316 315 207 207 175 175 
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 Data at the departamento level show that there is a difference in how evaluations of 
institutional performance affect levels of system support and levels of institutional legitimacy. 
There is not a clear set of evaluations of performance that seem to affect both dimensions of 
democratic legitimacy in the same way, although in all cases the relation is positive. That is, the 
higher the level of evaluation, the higher the levels of system support and perceived institutional 
legitimacy will be.  
This result is not surprising if one understands that both dimensions of democratic 
legitimacy measure different levels of it. It can be reasonably expected that what determines 
adherence to the democratic system underlying principles will be similar but not necessarily the 
same as what determines a perceived level of democratic legitimacy, which is a more practical 
dimension of political activity. 
On the other hand, this means that citizens are aware of both dimensions and consider 
different elements to be relevant for each dimension. Therefore, government policies and 
political practices should not ignore the importance of performing with equal efficiency in all 
possible fields, because neglect in some areas or unsatisfactory performance can be harmful for 
the general level of democratic legitimacy.  
 A regional configuration seems more diffuse when analyzing departamentos individually 
than when analyzing the national sample. No doubt there is a clear influence of the evaluations 
of institutional performance on perceived levels of institutional legitimacy and system support, 
but each region seems to have a unique set of interests that will determine adherence to the 
democratic system and institutional legitimacy
32
.  
                                                 
32
 In all cases the models have high levels of significance, with Rsquared scores greater than 0.3, except for 
Chuquisaca, which should be better explained by other elements.  
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Again, this is a reasonable outcome given the wide variation of contextual economic, 
political, social and cultural conditions across the nine regions in Bolivia as well as political 
leanings and positioning, which creates a unique general environment in each of the 
departamentos.  
The most shared element determining system support or institutional legitimacy amongst 
regions –and the only indication of a regional configuration around economic issues- is the 
evaluation of how the government manages the national economy. This is a statistically 
significant element in all regions except Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando where concerns with bad 
performance in reducing corruption practices and dealing with criminality issues (common to all 
three regions) are more important to their populations at the time adherence to the system is 
expressed and institutional legitimacy is perceived.  
This concern with institutional performance for providing solutions to the rising levels of 
criminality and reducing the feeling of insecurity is easily explained by the fact that all three of 
these regions share an extended border territory with Brazil and that most of Bolivia’s drug 
production and international traffic flows through this border. High criminality rates are 
commonly associated with drug traffic activity and given the evident lack of capability of the 
Bolivian police and the Army to patrol and control the border, towns and small communities in 
rural areas and even population in big cities are victims of the violence derived from this activity.  
Reports of drug related crime rates in Santa Cruz, nowadays the most populated city in 
Bolivia, have increased dramatically in the past five years, as has the presence of Colombian and 
Brazilian drug cartel elements in rural areas along the border in all three regions.  
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The feeling of insecurity or fear of being victim of crime is also a significant element in 
La Paz, Cochabamba and Tarija, which is a clear indicator of a perceived increase in criminality 
rate across all regions.  
On the other hand, Potosi presents a unique case since none of the institutional 
performance variables or perceptions of corruption, insecurity or the approval of the President 
yields any effect on the adherence to the democratic system. Potosi has increasingly been 
politically at odds with the national government, and economically it is the highest population 
expelling region in Bolivia. Since the decline of mining, Potosi has become a very poor region, 
with the lowest HDI level in the country and a high proportion of rural population living in 
isolated and difficult-to-reach areas.  
As for the determinants of perceived institutional legitimacy, all significant factors in this 
departamento are of an economic nature (performance on the reduction of corruption, 
unemployment and management of the national economy), logically following the current 
economic crisis in this region.  
Dealing with rising unemployment problems is also an important consideration in La Paz, 
Cochabamba and Tarija. 
The influence of the President’s approval is an important consideration in determining 
system support in Oruro and Cochabamba, the most supportive of the President and the regions 
with a higher vote for the President’s party, but for the most part, the effect of this variable fades 
when the regions are analyzed individually in the presence of a more regional or local nature.  
A clearly harmful element shared by the majority of regions is institutional performance 
in relation to effectively fighting and reducing corruption practices in the country. In seven of the 
nine regions, institutional performance and the perception of generalized corruption practices 
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amongst public officials are significant predictors of institutional legitimacy and system support 
(in 2 cases). The more successful the reduction of corruption practices, the higher the perceived 
level of institutional legitimacy will be, while the higher the perception of spreading corruption 
practices in the public field, the lower legitimacy will be.  
Finally, given the relevance of considerations of institutional performance in the 
management of the national economy and fields related to economic issues, a multilevel analysis 
tests the importance of the regional economic context and individual level economic 
considerations to assess their relative importance in determining system support and institutional 
legitimacy while still considering the effect of institutional performance.  
Table III.4 summarizes the results for both levels of democratic legitimacy measured.  
 
Table III-4. Multilevel analysis: institutional performance and economic contextual effect on system support 
and institutional legitimacy. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
 System 
Support 
Institutional 
Legitimacy 
Efficacy of institutional performance .428** .517** 
GNP (by departamento) 5.5 
-08
* 6.38 
-08
* 
Perceived national economic situation .036* .035* 
Individual economic situation .056*  
Wealth  .525*  
N 2,761 2,777 
 
Results of the multilevel analysis confirm the existence and importance of a contextual 
economic effect (by departamento) that holds, even when taking into account the effect of 
institutional performance in determining levels of system support and institutional legitimacy for 
the whole country.  
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The same is true for the sociotropic variable measuring individual perceptions of the 
national economic situation, statistically significant in determining legitimacy in both 
dimensions, as measured by the system support and institutional legitimacy indexes.  
On the other hand, individual level considerations of the personal economic situation and 
personal wealth are only significant for the dimension of system support, but not for the 
perceived level of institutional legitimacy. These results attest to the fact that individuals make a 
distinction when considering both dimensions of legitimacy and seem to attribute responsibility 
of their personal economic situation to the general design of the democratic system, but not 
necessarily to the effect of the performance of central democratic institutions, including 
institutions in the Judicial and the Legislative branches.  
Conclusions 
Individual level evaluations of institutional performance are a powerful predictor of 
democratic legitimacy in Bolivia, measured in two dimensions by the system support and 
institutional legitimacy indexes. 
Although the process of change implemented by President Morales’ government 
encourages personalistic political practices, exercises a charismatic leadership and seeks to draw 
legitimacy for policies and decisions from electoral outcomes and popularity expressions, 
Bolivians still consider institutional performance to be a central source of democratic 
legitimacy, affecting their adherence to the system in general as well as their perceived level of 
institutional legitimacy.  
Performance remains a strong predictor of system support and institutional legitimacy 
when taking into account each field of institutional activity individually and when considering 
the nine regions individually. But, its effect is lessened when the political and economic contexts 
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at the sub-national level are included in the analysis, meaning that not only institutions need to 
perform efficiently, but they also need to respond to regional specificities and needs in order to 
strengthen legitimacy and support.  
At the same time, a good institutional performance will not be enough to guarantee 
legitimacy and support when other factors such as regional economic and political dynamics are 
taken into account and especially if these dynamics depart from the ideology and the model 
underlying the design and function of institutions. 
Regional variation determined by economic and political conditions suggests a clear 
regional configuration when it comes to assessing the relative importance of institutional 
performance in determining democratic legitimacy.  
There is a consistent dissatisfaction with general institutional performance in the eastern 
region of the country or the “media luna” region, expressed in poorer evaluations of institutional 
performance, both for the institutional efficacy index and when analyzing the individual 
components of the index, in the eastern regions compared to the rest of the country. 
Nevertheless, this configuration weakens when the regions are analyzed individually, in part due 
to the unique economic, social and political context in each region. The economic contextual 
effect of the region holds as a valid predictor of democratic legitimacy when taking into account 
the effect of institutional performance.  
As for what these results say about the performance of the new Bolivian State and New 
Left program, I think the most telling element is the predominance of the President’s figure when 
evaluating institutional performance and consequently, legitimacy and system support. Efficient 
and independent institutions are vital to the stability of the political system, but Bolivian 
institutions seem to be only mildly efficient and not independent. On the contrary, people 
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evaluate them through a political filter and the importance of the effect of the support for the 
President is not really measuring the performance of institution, but rather saying something 
about a bigger picture, the project and the model of the new Bolivian State.  
Thus, the Plurinational State finds itself with highly dependent institutions which draw 
authority and approval from the President and his project and much less from their own 
performance. On top of that, national policy at this moment does not have a plan or project to 
strengthen institutions or to institutionalize decision making, policy making and other 
procedures. On the contrary, political discourse suggests that institutions are strengthened by 
appointing the “right” people to them and personnel replacement is the norm.  
Moreover, results show that Bolivians are divided on their support and perceptions about 
the process of change and the New Left policy package. Those who approve and support the new 
State model rate institutional performance higher and perceive more legitimacy in the system. 
Those who oppose or distrust the new model are less satisfied with institutional performance and 
perceive lower legitimacy levels of the political system. Still, divided we stand.   
The next chapter studies the effect of specific economic contexts measured with regional 
dummies and also the effect of individual perceptions about economic conditions on regional 
dynamics of legitimacy in Bolivia to further understand the effect of economic elements on the 
citizens’ adherence to the system within the context of the New Left policy package that is being 
implemented in the country.  
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Chapter IV . Regional Dynamics of Bolivian Democratic Legitimacy 
 
This chapter studies democratic legitimacy in Bolivia amidst an ongoing process of 
change implemented by the national government that goes beyond changing State policies to 
changing the principles of the political system, the intent being to build a more “just and 
socially-oriented” Plurinational State, as it is now styled, starting with its core principles and 
values continuing through its institutions and administrative organization.  
One of the main changes in administrative organization and institutional reform is the 
recent restructuring of territorial administrative units at the regional level (departamentos) with 
the creation of autonomous Gobernaciones departmentales that respond more to regional and 
popular demands than to an initial will of the national government. As a result, the dynamics of 
Bolivian politics have been changed, and the political game is now being played, to a large 
degree, in the regional political arena.  
This national project also includes a new policy package especially focused on social 
policy for the redistribution of wealth with the hopes that it indirectly contributes to the 
alleviation of poverty, which among other elements includes the nationalization of all major 
industries and natural resources exploitation, the distribution of public economic resources 
through direct yearly payments for disadvantaged groups (bonos) and effective political 
inclusion of indigenous people in decision making.  
The implications of such a change for the stability of democracy and for its legitimacy 
are still unknown, and predictions are not all positive, for while the national government still 
maintains a clear majority and enjoys a healthy popular support, especially the Executive, 
relations between the autonomous regional governments and the national government are not 
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easy, and political conflict has been a constant since the process of change started, generating 
moments of tense political polarization.    
In addition to this, cultural, economic and social demands and interests have added to the 
already large amount of conflict that characterizes the ongoing process of change and, very 
recently, unexpected economic instability
33
 has rekindled the flame of social and political unrest 
and the fear of instability.  
This chapter concentrates on studying the conditions that affect democratic legitimacy at 
the sub-national (regional) level in Bolivia under the assumption that, given that the 
departamento is the new arena in which the political game is played, the differences and 
similarities of the evaluations and perceptions of citizens of these regions can strengthen or 
weaken the legitimacy of Bolivian democracy.  
Methodology of the analysis  
 In this chapter, the dependent variable, democratic legitimacy, is measured by the two 
indexes mentioned in the introduction that address two of the dimensions of the concept, as 
defined first by Easton and subsequently refined by other scholars (Easton 1965; Lipset 1981; 
Norris 2004; Seligson and Booth 2009). These two indexes also measure legitimacy at the 
individual level.  
The dependent variable is operationalized in two variables measuring system support 
and the legitimacy of political institutions key to the political system.  
                                                 
33
 Economic trouble was always denied by the national government until very recently. Until the last months of 
2010, the official claim was that Bolivia had a stable economic growth and that it was practically “untouched” by 
the previous years’ international economic crisis. Due to this official position, the general public was not expecting 
either inflation or economic instability, which led to an 80% increase of gasoline prices (policy that was withdrawn a 
few days after its issuance) and to the sudden scarcity of basic staple products such as sugar, flour and rice. 
Recently, the national government has also publicly admitted that it lacks the capacity to produce as much natural 
gas and gasoline as it projected and that income of this –almost exclusive- export product have caused a deficit in 
the public budget.  
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The adequacy of this index can be empirically noticed by observing the distribution of 
trust among the different components that form this index in this sample of Bolivia in 2010 (see 
Graph IV.1 below). 
 
Graph IV-1. Trust in components of legitimacy of political institutions index. Bolivia, 2010. 
AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
What stands out the most is that the variables leading the index in the sample are 
precisely the National Government (the Executive) and the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, 
while the institutions related to the Judicial branch and the political parties lag behind in trust and 
are significantly different and in a lower level of trust than the Executive and Legislative 
institutions. These results correspond precisely to the popular and media views of distribution of 
power and support in the current state of affairs in Bolivia. Thus, from the beginning the index 
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confirms with empirical evidence this state of legitimacy distribution among the core institutions 
of the Bolivian State.  
Over the years, LAPOP studies have been showing that levels of system support and 
institutional legitimacy vary across regions following a relatively stable pattern, unless under 
conditions of crisis or unexpected events in one or another of the departamentos. The assumption 
is that regions showing higher levels of support tend to maintain them over time as do regions 
with low levels of support.  
Drawing from the ample theory produced about this issue, another assumption of this 
study is that both measurements of democratic legitimacy are influenced by economically 
relevant factors both at the individual-level (such as satisfaction with the economic situation -
domestic and individual- and a retrospective evaluation of the economic situation) and at the 
aggregate level, such as the economic level of regional development (measured here through 
DHI departmental scores
34
). A special case is the variable of the government's economic 
performance, which would turn out to be a combination of a political and economic individual-
level evaluation that also influences democratic legitimacy.  
Finally, a political variable that is assumed to affect democratic legitimacy is the level of 
trust of the citizen in the regional government (or Prefectura, now called Gobernación). Given 
that we are concerned with the regional variations in legitimacy, this variable is key to following 
the political regional patterns of the relation between citizens and the State. The assumption is 
that the higher the adherence and trust in the regional government, the higher legitimacy will be. 
The measurement of political factors affecting legitimacy is complemented by individual-level 
evaluations of the performance of the President and an electoral preference for the ruling party.  
                                                 
34
 The DHI data at the departamento level are from 2004. There are no available updated DHI scores differentiated 
by departamento for Bolivia. 
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The combination of individual and aggregate factors enriches the understanding of the 
phenomena under study, allowing for the combination of complementary elements that affect 
political processes in different but simultaneous ways: the subject and the context. 
These assumptions are based on the theory presented above and on the enormous amount 
of empirical research contributing evidence to understanding the dynamics of legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, some of these theories and assumptions, when tested in a purely Latin American 
context, yield results that contradict what has been assumed so far for highly industrialized 
democracies (Schwarz-Blum, 2007), and the assumption in this case is that findings for Bolivian 
regional samples will continue to contradict what theory indicates should be expected, for 
although we are attempting to implement a Western model of democracy, and we are largely 
succeeding at it. Latin American countries are not Western developed countries, but countries 
with their own unique cultural, social, economic and political configurations. In this sense, 
Bolivia is far less ”Western”, since the undergoing process of change intends to willingly 
distance itself from the Western model of nation.  
This chapter focuses on the regional dynamics of democratic legitimacy using the 
LAPOP 2010 Bolivia sample that is representative of the population at the sub-national level. 
There is wide variance across the nine Bolivian regions in regards to the economic contextual 
variable and acceptable variance in system support and institutional legitimacy. The variation in 
levels of economic development (the contextual variable) and distribution of wealth among 
Bolivian regions provide enough material to find enlightening details about the workings of 
legitimacy at the sub-national level.   
Finally, the project employs statistical models and instruments (mixed models 
regressions) that account for the different types of data that are combined here and that will 
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ultimately contribute to bring about a broader understanding of the question of legitimacy in a 
Latin American context.   
Analysis and Interpretation of Results 
In order to go further in understanding the predictors and the meaning of this variation, 
the analysis of the regional dynamics of system support and institutional legitimacy is based on a 
mixed effects regression model that assumes there must be an effect of the departamento level 
generating not only the variance between departamentos but also one that is expected to reflect 
the grouping pattern already found in previous research (Vargas Villazón 2009) making up two 
macro-regions of differing political and economic views. The outcomes of the regression models 
are presented in the following table (Table IV.1). 
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Table IV-1. Predictors of system support and legitimacy of political institutions. Bolivia 2010. 
AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
* Perception of national economy       * sig. <.005 
** Perception of national economy, previous year     ** sig. < 01 
*** Perception of individual economic situation 
**** Perception of individual economic situation, previous year 
 
Outcomes from the previous regression analysis (model 1) show clear evidence of the big 
impact that the level of HDI
35
 has on the variation of system support and legitimacy of political 
institutions levels. Results also suggest that economic and political considerations take part in the 
definition of both system support and institutional legitimacy. In the case of system support, the 
level of individual wealth and a positive evaluation of the individual economic situation would 
                                                 
35
 This is a contextual effect that assumes that all citizens living in the same departamento share the same level of 
human development. Although this assumption cannot be true, for there are differences of development within 
departamentos, the effect of this contextual variable also cannot be ignored.  
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
System Support 
Institutional 
legitimacy 
System 
Support 
Institutional 
legitimacy 
Indigenous     
Wealth .7108*  .6613*  
President approval .0992* .0806* .0944* .0872* 
MAS vote     
PNE*     
PNE PY**    .0179** 
PIES*** .0422*    
PIES PY****     
Gvt Economic 
performance 
.2978* .3762* .3094* .3744*  
Trust Prefectura .1950* .2201* .1851* .2048* 
HDI 29.968* 24.973* -------- -------- 
La Paz   -4.723* -3.737* 
Beni   2.146**  
Tarija     
Cochabamba     -2.567* 
Oruro   -3.504*  
Potosi   -4.010* -4.989* 
Chuquisaca   -5.711* -2.094** 
Pando    -4.436* 
     
N 2,504 2,515 2,504 2,515 
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generate an increase in system support. As for the political considerations, a positive evaluation 
of the President’s performance as well as the government’s economic performance36 would 
improve support for the political system in place. It is curious though that partisanship measured 
as electoral preference for the ruling party has no effect on system support. Finally, higher levels 
of trust in the regional government (Gobernación) will logically increase support for the system.  
It is important to notice that, despite the official favorable inclination of the current 
government towards building a State that recognizes and highly values indigenous populations, 
the variable of self-identification as indigenous has no effect on system support levels.  
As for the case of the legitimacy of core political institutions, citizens seem to have a 
more objective view, since only their objective evaluations of the President’s and the 
government’s economic performance and their trust in another important political institution, the 
Gobernación, have an effect on institutional legitimacy perceptions.  
Model 2 explores the fixed effect of the regional level variable (departamento) on the 
determination of both, system support and institutional legitimacy. Results confirm this 
expectation and also show a grouping pattern similar to the one showed above in that, taking 
Santa Cruz as the reference category, data show a statistically significant negative difference for 
La Paz, Oruro, Potosi and Chuquisaca. This means that the levels of system support in these 
departamentos are statistically lower than the level in Santa Cruz, which reports the higher level 
of HDI and of participation in national GNP.  
On top of this, the analysis shows that the individual levels of wealth as well as the 
performance variables and trust in the Gobernación continue to have an effect on the variation of 
system support levels.  
                                                 
36
 Government’s economic performance is based on an index composed of four variables that reflect an objective 
individual level evaluation of government performance in fighting poverty, fighting corruption within governmental 
spheres, fighting unemployment and its management of the national economy.  
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The same goes for the measurement of legitimacy of political institutions. La Paz, 
Cochabamba, Potosi, Chuquisaca and Pando show a negative, statistically significant difference 
with Santa Cruz, confirming the grouping pattern that would confirm the existence of two 
macro-regions dividing the country into East and West. In this case, Pando (expected to be part 
of the Eastern region) constitutes an exception that can be easily explained by the events of 2008 
and the later governmental intervention of its institutions by the central government which has 
caused citizen distrust towards the institutions of the State.  
With the confirmation that a specific regional dynamic of system support and legitimacy 
of the political institutions is clearly happening at the regional level, this study furthers the 
analysis to search for the predictors of both levels of legitimacy that are specific to each 
departamento. This analysis takes the same model run at the national level to be analyzed at the 
sub-national level assuming that combinations of both, an effect of the specific economic 
situation and of political regional and national elements, affect the determination of regional 
system support and institutional legitimacy.  
The expectation of finding a grouping pattern of departamentos that form two macro-
regions of conflicting economic, developmental and political views still holds for this level of the 
analysis. The expectation is to find similarities between departamentos that supposedly belong to 
a same macro-region (whether East or West) and to find differences between departamentos 
pertaining to different macro-regions.  
This expectation is not purely speculative. This grouping pattern is evident when 
observing the regional distribution of trust in the Regional Government (Gobernación) and the 
distribution of approval of the President’s performance (see Figures 6 and 7 in the Appendix). 
The same pattern is also observed when analyzing the levels of trust in individual components of 
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the system support index, specifically for the indicators of pride of living in this political system 
and of belief in that one must support the system. Thus, expectation to see a macro-region pattern 
forming as well among the predictors of the two dimensions of legitimacy is reasonable.  
Results of the regression analyses performed for each departamento and for each 
dimension of legitimacy (system support and institutional legitimacy) are presented in Table 
IV.2, below.  
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Table IV-2. Linear regression results for the predictors of system support and institutional legitimacy by departamento. Bolivia, 2010. 
AmericasBarometer by  LAPOP 
 
 
* Perception of national economy       * sig. p <.001 
** Perception of national economy, previous year     ** sig. p < 05 
*** Perception of individual economic situation 
**** Perception of individual economic situation, previous year 
 
Indep. 
variables 
Dependent variables 
La Paz Oruro Potosí Cochabamba Chuquisaca Tarija Santa Cruz Beni Pando 
Sys  Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg Sys Leg 
Indigenous   3.673**              -10.2* -6.009** 
Wealth   1.64* 1.633*  -1.488*        -1.161*     
President 
approval 
 .1024** .1705*    .1022** .1226*     .1636* .1833* .1221* .1632*   
MAS vote   6.319*            -.0548**    
PNE*            .1511*    -.119**   
PNE PY**           .0959* .0709*       
PIES***       .141**  .1366* .117** .0776**        
PIES PY****           .0569**      .086* .106* 
Gvt 
Economic 
performance 
.3359* .3466* .283* .4175* .2546* .3539* .2682* .3689* .136** .2842* .3671* .4548* .2648* .3752* .3486* .3593* .4466* .3239* 
Trust 
Gobernacion 
.1931* .3042* .1939* .1808* .1800* .1687* .2492* .3001* .1712* .2141* .1528* .1284* .1519* .1709* .1566* .2315* .2255* .3106* 
                   
R-squared .4113 .5473 .4097 .4569 .251 .4156 .3956 .5952 .229 .3732 .595 .6103 .3889 .4794 .3827 .4679 .6584 .6369 
                   
N 331 332 259 260 283 283 331 336 248 250 261 263 334 333 224 224 233 234 
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 What shows more clearly from the results of the regressions at the departmento level is 
that all departamentos share two similarities: positive individual level evaluations of the 
government’s economic performance and higher levels of trust in the regional government 
(Gobernación) determine higher levels of both dimensions of legitimacy, system support and 
legitimacy of political institutions, independently of the specific economic situation or of any 
other political regional or national considerations and of the macro-regional alignment. 
Regression outcomes show that these results are very robust despite the small N of the 
departmental samples. In other words, a better economic performance of the central government 
will clearly benefit levels of legitimacy across regions.  
As for the case of trust in regional governments, Graph IV.4 below illustrates the relation 
between this variable and legitimacy of political institutions by departamento. As can be seen 
from these graphs, the relation is positive for all cases, but less pronounced in Santa Cruz, Beni 
and Tarija, which happen to be the departamentos in which regional government is controlled by 
the opposition to the current government and which are the main core of what is considered the 
Eastern macro-region. In this way, although the positive relation holds, one can see that trust in 
opposition-led regional governments will benefit institutional legitimacy in a somewhat weaker 
way than trust in Gobernaciones led by the ruling party.  
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Graph IV-2. Fitted values of the relation between trust in regional government and legitimacy of political 
institutions. Bolivia 2010, AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
 
 These results agree with evidence from previous research (Weitz-Shapiro 2008) which 
already showed the importance of the effect of the sub-national institution  performance on 
system support and adherence to the democratic regime. The regionally differentiated relation 
between trust in regional government and legitimacy also coincides with Weitz-Shapiro’s results 
in that they show that citizens do not trust the institution blindly but are able to differentiate the 
quality of the performance and the character of the institution.  
 Other interesting outcomes from the analysis concern the legitimacy of political 
institutions index. Note that in Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija individual level evaluations of 
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the national and mainly of the individual economic situation
37
 are predictors of institutional 
legitimacy and not so evidently of system support. Additionally, these variables are not so 
important in the other departamentos, which form the Western macro-region. Thus, not only is 
there a clear difference between the departamentos of East and West, but also a clear grouping 
based on differing views on the importance of economic considerations when defining adherence 
to the political system and, more broadly, the perception of democratic legitimacy in the country.  
 These findings also imply that citizens in these departamentos are capable of making a 
qualitative distinction between the two dimensions of legitimacy, since the economic 
considerations affect evaluations of the institutional dimension of democracy but do not have the 
same effect on the dimension that refers to democratic principles and to political community.  
 Continuing with the importance of the economy on democratic legitimacy, data show that 
considerations of individual level of wealth
38
 are important only to citizens in Oruro and Potosi. 
These two departamentos share the economic characteristics of being among the poorest in the 
country in absolute terms, formerly the center of national economy during the tin era and 
currently with a small contribution to national GNP. They also are “population expelling” 
departamentos due to the lack of economic opportunity and both belong to the Western macro-
region of the country.  
 Individual level evaluations of the personal economic situation are relevant to 
determining system support in Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Tarija and Pando. For these citizens, 
their personal economic situation in the present affects the way they perceive the appropriateness 
of democratic principles that guide the political system.  
                                                 
37
 This is measured by four variables: two sociotropic variables that measure individual level perceptions of the 
present national economic situation and in the past year, and two ideotropic variables measuring individual level 
perceptions of the present individual economic situation and in the past year.  
38
 This variable is measured in quintiles of wealth based on an index of possession of material goods.  
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 As for political considerations affecting democratic legitimacy, a favorable evaluation of 
the President’s general performance will affect both dimensions of legitimacy and increase the 
level of system support as well as the perceived level of institutional legitimacy in 
departamentos in the west (variable is statistically significant in La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba) 
and the east (variable is also significant in Santa Cruz and Beni) of the country.  
Although expected, there seems to be no specific grouping or difference here between 
departamentos belonging to opposing macro-regions. It is unexpected though, to observe the 
effect of this variable in Santa Cruz, but especially so in Beni, because it is a low population 
department with very low levels of internal migration (while Santa Cruz has a large amount of 
migrants that arrive from western regions) and openly opposed to the current Presidency. And 
yet, these results agree with the theory on performance and system support that states that a 
favorable evaluation of governmental performance (of almost any institution) should have a 
positive effect on legitimacy levels.  
It is important to pay attention to two special cases among the results. The only ethnic 
identification variable included in the model is one variable that asks for self-identification of the 
interviewee as an indigenous person. This variable had no effect in the regression models run at 
the national level, but was included in the sub-national level models because the distribution of 
indigenous populations, their ethnic background and their specific weight in the total population 
of any departamento varies widely. Results show that this variable has no weight when defining 
perceived levels of legitimacy except for two very special cases: in Oruro, a western region with 
high levels of Quechua population, with the highest levels of system support, institutional 
legitimacy and approval of the President’s performance in the country. In this case, on top of 
being a citizen of this departamento, being an indigenous person will generate higher levels of 
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system support or, in fact there is a stronger identification with the system’s principles and 
political community among indigenous individuals in Oruro.  
Pando presents precisely the opposite situation. The indigenous variable is statistically 
significant in Pando for both dimensions of democratic legitimacy, but its coefficient is negative 
which means that an indigenous person in Pando is less identified with the system’s principles 
and political community and will tend to trust less in the legitimacy of the core institutions of the 
State. In fact, this finding is explained by the current political situation in Pando, which started 
with an intervention of all political institutions in the departamento by the national government 
after a still unclear conflict between opposing political factions that ended with several deaths, 
the Prefecto of Pando in jail, politicians that are political refugees in Brazil and all institutions 
intervened by the national government. In this context, an indigenous in Pando will definitely 
distrust both the institutions and the principles of a regime that behaves in such a way.  
Finally, in the current political situation, with the Executive and the Legislative 
controlled by the incumbent party (MAS) and with a generalized high level of support for the 
President, it is surprising that the variable that expresses an electoral preference
39
 for this party 
will have almost no effect on the perceived level of democratic legitimacy in Bolivia. The 
expected effect of this variable is to show that MAS voters (would be the winners, following 
Lijphart’s classification) identify closely with the system’s principles and political community 
and that they trust that the core institutions of the State are legitimate with more strength than 
those who did not vote for MAS (the losers).  
Empirical evidence resulting from the regression analyses at the sub-national level show 
two interesting things: partisanship has nothing to do with democratic legitimacy in Bolivia.  
                                                 
39
 This variable is a dummy created from variable vb3: Whom did you vote for in the past election? It cannot be that 
respondents forgot who they voted for, because general elections were held in December 2009 and the survey 
interviews were held during the months of February and March 2010.  
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Second, in the few exceptions where partisanship does matter, it has an effect only on the 
ideological dimension of legitimacy (the system support variable) but no effect on the more 
objective variable of institutional legitimacy. The effect of this political consideration is valid in 
Oruro, again, where the winners of the last electoral competition are more strongly identified 
with the system’s principles and its corresponding political community. On the other hand, in 
Beni the effect of having voted for the incumbent party causes a decrease in system support, this 
probably being the effect of winners being a minority in a political context in open opposition to 
the ruling party.  
Conclusions 
There is much insight and detail to be gained by looking at the dynamics of democratic 
legitimacy at the sub-national level. The regional dynamics of politics do not necessarily always 
correspond to the national dynamics of the political game.  
Findings of this work have confirmed previous evidence that there is a persistent 
similarity of political views and economic considerations among departamentos belonging to the 
same macro-region (East or West) and that there are persistent differences between 
departamentos belonging to opposing macro-regions. But the evidence very strongly shows that 
there are also coincidences across-regions that are stronger than any regional differences. 
Governmental economic performance and trust in the Regional Government are strong and 
robust predictors of both dimensions of democratic legitimacy across the board.  
The results of the regressions at the sub-national level also confirm the fact that national 
politics is being played out heavily at the departamento level thus reinforcing the notion that this 
administrative level is increasing its importance as the arena where decisions are being made.  
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Objective evaluations of the economic situation are, in all, a stronger predictor of 
democratic legitimacy than some more subjective variables, such as ethnic identity, partisanship 
or even individual level of wealth. Evaluations of the personal economic situation are more 
important than evaluations of the national economic situation, but only in few departamentos. 
This is a sign of the intensity of the influence of the political momentum that Bolivia is 
experiencing. Theory tells us that economic considerations should be expected to overpower 
political considerations, but this true only for a few regions and even there, evaluations of the 
government’s performance and trust in the regional government are stronger and more robust 
predictors of legitimacy.  
Finally, the dynamics of Bolivian politics tend to be excessively focused on three 
departamentos which hold the bigger proportion of population in the country and are called “the 
axis” (La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz)40. Attention to political events and conflicts is 
practically focused on these three areas both by the media and the government. But the evidence 
shows that the surprises and exceptions are located in departamentos outside the axis, such as 
Oruro, Beni, Pando, Chuquisaca and Potosi.  
Aside from the predictors of governmental economic performance and trust in the 
regional government shared with the rest of the departamentos, there is basically no other 
predictor working in Chuquisaca and the R-squared for system support is the lowest of all sub-
national units, which means that there is something at work in Chuquisaca that this model cannot 
explain. Something similar happens in Potosi, where the R-squared for the system support model 
is very low and there is no predictor at all explaining the dynamics of system support in the 
departmento aside from the ones that work across regions.  
                                                 
40
 The “axis” departments combined are responsible for producing 67.6% of the national GNP and are number 1 
(Santa Cruz), 3 (La Paz) and 4 (Cochabamba) in HDI levels. They also are the three richer departmentos in the 
country in terms of absolute GNP.   
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Meanwhile, nothing in the modeling of the axis region draws special attention and these 
departamentos behave according to what can be expected from theory and evidence from 
previous studies. Conflict, change or a different configuration of regional politics in regards to 
legitimacy are brewing outside the axis and are receiving little or no attention
41
 at all from both 
the media and the national government. The most important evidence drawn from this study is 
that in the new regional configuration of Bolivian political dynamics we need to be looking 
outside the axis for potential threats or beneficial dynamics for democratic legitimacy.  
My final chapter takes this analysis to the international arena and studies perceptions of 
legitimacy and institutional performance at the supra-national level. The analysis includes all the 
elements I have studied so far at the sub-national level, including the effect of economic 
considerations both at the individual and the national level and also the effect of a specific 
political context by country.  
   
                                                 
41
 In January 2011, conflict exploded in Llallagua (Potosi) where peasants went to the city to protest against the 
increasing prices of basic food products (the only specific predictor working in the institutional legitimacy model in 
this departamento is individual level of wealth). The protest ended with confrontations with local populations, 
plundering of local commercial businesses and much public and private property destroyed. This conflict only 
follows previous protests and confrontations with the national government in Potosi for the judicial process initiated 
against Potosi’s elected Governor, Rene Joaquino, member of an opposing party. Joaquino was sentenced and the 
current Governor of Potosi is a MAS member.  
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Chapter V . Citizen Perceptions of Legitimacy and Institutional Performance in Latin 
America  
 
Legitimacy of the State and its institutions is the most frequent and important evaluation 
citizens make of the democratic political system. Even though it is difficult to measure and 
capture, legitimacy is the most accurate evaluation of the degree of suitability of the democratic 
system and its institutions because it is given by the subjects of democracy according to their 
values and expectations to which the political system is expected to answer.  
Over 25 years have passed since the beginning of the wave of transformations and 
reforms that ended the dictatorial regimes in Latin America and the return to democracy started. 
This process of reforms has remained constant and has removed reasons to believe that Latin 
American democracies could be at risk of returning to authoritarian regimes even though some 
cases, such as Honduras a few years ago, may still face critical moments.  
The drive to search and build a real Latin American democracy that responds to the needs 
and expectations of Latin American citizens and that is designed and conceived according to the 
Latin American reality has resulted in a profuse multiplication of levels, actors, institutions, 
processes, regulations, dynamics and even historical periods that overlap on one political system 
and moreover, happens in a challengingly short period of time for the social capacity to 
assimilate deep transformations.  
These elements have determined that an outstanding characteristic of the consolidations 
and democratic transformation process in the region is the increasing complexity of Latin 
American society and reality as a result of a multiplication of fields of opportunity and conflict in 
the social, economic, cultural and political arenas, all at the same time.  
The legitimacy of institutions, actors and decisions involved in this process seems to 
constitute one of the main concerns and demands of Latin American society. In other words, we 
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are worried that institutions, actors and decisions are genuine, appropriate and suitable to our 
reality and the principles and values guiding the actions of the State, its institutions and our 
representatives appropriately respond to Latin American reality.  
In this enterprise, institutional reform processes have been a constant presence in 
democracies in the region, mostly implemented as institutional packages of structural 
adjustment. The surge of new institutions and long reform and change processes are viewed with 
distrust and concern by several civil society sectors, while for others, these reforms mean 
progress in feelings of inclusion and equality, as well as an opening to more political 
participation opportunities that go beyond the electoral field (Przeworski 1991; Seligson and 
Cordova 2010).  
These experiences have proven that translating ideal models and institutions to diverse 
realities is no easy task, even less so when dealing with complex realities and diverging 
preferences as to the basic democratic model chosen to be implemented in the region. While 
some social sectors prefer a procedural democratic model, others are more inclined towards the 
construction of social democracies. The latter are not limited to the political arena, but rather are 
oriented to the promotion of equality, inclusion and increasing social participation in decision 
making processes.  
Institutions are the central element of all democratic models. They play a crucial role in 
the construction and consolidation of democracies and are the channel through which the citizen 
relates to the State. Institutions reproduce principles, ideas and values underlying the democratic 
model; they enforce them and strengthen them in society through their interaction with the 
citizenry (Torcal and Montero 2006).   
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So, what sorts of institutions are appropriate for society and the strengthening of 
democracy? Which reforms are necessary to respond to needs and interests of the citizenry? 
Which sectors need to be reformed; what is reformed and what is renewed? Which institutions 
and policies strengthen democracy, and which weaken it? Which institutions favor the exercise 
of a comprehensive citizenship? 
The answers to these questions are as complex as society is and cannot be considered 
only under the light of theoretical considerations about the democratic model. One of the most 
important answers in these situations must be the one provided by the citizens that are subject to 
the norms, procedures and values represented by their political system. These subjects are the 
ones that relate on a day-to-day basis with the institutions and their State.  
Another valid answer is provided by those institutions and is expressed through their 
performance, which determines not only their political legitimacy but also their democratic 
quality and the quality of life of the civil society. Thus, this chapter concentrates on the 
democratic legitimacy in Latin American countries as perceived by their citizens. It focuses with 
special emphasis on the institutional face of the democracies in the region through citizen 
evaluation of the performance of central institutions of the State and the principles of the 
political system.  
This chapter takes into account the elements that affect democratic legitimacy and 
individual perceptions of citizens of 18 Latin American countries about institutional performance 
in the economic field (including the fight against poverty and distribution of wealth) in order to 
evaluate the degree of democratic legitimacy in the region and in each of the countries 
individually.  
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This includes a focus on the main subjective and objective factors that affect individual 
perceptions about the legitimacy of the central democratic institutions and the willingness to 
support the political system as a frame of coexistence in the public sphere. A special emphasis is 
placed on measuring the weight of the national economic context and the impact of individual 
economic conditions on democratic legitimacy in Latin American democracies.  
Assumptions and Methodology 
Theory suggests that, given its subjective character, measurement of regime legitimacy 
cannot be directly made through objective or tangible indicators and that, for a more precise 
approach, it needs to be assumed as a multidimensional study requiring a combination of several 
measurements in order to more accurately represent reality.  
Legitimacy is not only generated at the State level as the only source but is composed of 
several variables at different levels (Gilley 2006), which have been already defined in the 
introductory chapter of this work. 
The country is the main level of analysis in this chapter. This allows comparisons to be 
made of national averages between countries to analyze the political behavior of citizens of one 
country with the rest of the countries in the sample. At the same time, this focus allows for 
studying behaviors, attitudes, perceptions and opinions of citizens in practically all Latin 
American countries providing a general view of democracy, its institutions and legitimacy in the 
whole region.  
Additionally, the analysis of this data at the individual level allows perceptions, attitudes 
and behaviors of citizens with similar characteristics to be studied, even when they are not in the 
same country. For example, data indicate that the higher the perception of corruption in political 
institutions, the lower legitimacy will be. This means that citizens that perceive high levels of 
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corruption in political institutions will believe less in their legitimacy regardless of the country in 
which they live. At the same time, analysis at the individual level makes it possible to know 
behaviors and political attitudes of Latin Americans in general
42
 at the regional level 
independently of the immediate national context.  
This index measures legitimacy of the political institutions at the individual level, based 
on trust evaluations made by citizens. Its reliability is also supported by the fact that these are 
public, visible institutions and that it is safe to assume that citizens have enough knowledge 
about all of them to allow them to evaluate their performance in a reliable way.  
Since the index represents a trust average of all institutions it is important to observe 
whether the distribution of trust is relatively equal for all institutions or whether some of them 
may be leading the index’s value or biasing it. Ideally, in a democracy with stable and strong 
institutions, citizens should trust each of them to a relatively equal degree
43
.  
The following section presents detailed results of the analyses implemented for this 
chapter based for both legitimacy indexes. It also discusses results about the main factors that 
influence the indexes and the contextual elements that determine them, evaluating also 
differences and similarities of conditions among countries in the region.   
  
                                                 
42
 The analysis includes only 18 countries from Mexico to Chile. The only country in the Caribbean region is the 
Dominican Republic.  
43
 It is important to notice that an equal distribution of trust among all institutions in the index is considered “ideal.” 
In reality, distribution of trust is never equal for all institutions. Nevertheless, if there was one special institution 
with a trust average significantly higher or lower than the rest of the institutions in the index, this could bias the 
entire index and its significance.  
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 Legitimacy of Political Institutions and System Support in a Comparative 
Perspective 
  
The following graph represents the distribution of the average trust in political 
 
 institutions for Latin American countries in 2010.  
 
  
Graph V-1. Average trust in political institutions in the index of legitimacy of political institutions. Source: 
AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010.  
 
 The data in the public opinion survey round of 2010 show that citizens trust the national 
government more than any other institution in the index as an average for all countries in the 
sample. This result is significant for it suggests that Latin American democracies still have a 
tendency to trust mostly in strong personalistic leaderships
44
 that concentrate power in the 
Executive over the Legislative and that they prefer executive institutions over those that 
                                                 
44
 This result is not exclusive for 2010. The data show that this is also true for the survey rounds of 2006 and 2008 
and support the existence of a trend over time.  
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emphasize representation and distribution of power, which would be represented by Congress 
and the political parties.  
 The temporal perspective shows that the average trust in national governments has been 
constantly increasing between 2006 and 2010 for Latin America considered as one region. The 
countries with higher levels of trust in this institution are Uruguay, El Salvador and Chile, while 
Peru and Argentina present very low levels of trust in their national governments.  
 Moreover, to strenghten this result, respondents do not express a clear preference 
between institutions of the Legislative and the Judicial, since average levels of trust in Congress, 
the Supreme Court and the justice system are similar among all of them and are only slightly 
under the medium point of the 100-point scale.  
 Political parties are not trustworthy in the views of Latin American citizens. But, this is 
not an exclusively Latin American phenomenon, since political parties are suffering from lack of 
trust in all regions of the world. Trust in these institutions has remained practically at the same 
level between 2006 and 2010. Uruguay and Honduras register levels of trust significantly higher 
than the rest of the countries in the region, while Ecuador, Argentina and Guatemala have lower 
levels of trust in the sample. This is not a constant tendency in the case of Honduras; this 
situation can rather be a product of the general surge of trust in political institutions experienced 
in that country after stabilization of the democratic regime after the 2009 crisis.  
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Graph V-2. Average of system support for LAtin American countries. Source: AmericasBarometer by 
LAPOP, 2010.  
 
 Graph V.2 presents disagreggated average levels of trust for the elements that form the 
system support index for Latin American countries as a region. Among these components, the 
strongest is trust in political institutions of the democratic regime, followed by the belief in 
supporting the political system and the pride in being part of the political community.   
 Results suggest that the role of political institutions is not a minor one and, from the 
citizens’ perception, they play an important role in considerations about the democratic system 
and its legitimacy.  
 On the other hand, it is concerning to see that variables referring to the justice system 
(belief in a fair trial) and to the protection of basic citizen rights are the less trusted lements in 
the index on average for all Latin American countries in the sample, suggesting that Latin 
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American democracies are still weak in guaranteeing the respect for vital principles without 
which presence a regime could not be called essentially democratic.  
These results also indicate that, despite a sizable portion of the Latin American 
population expressing their preference for a democratic model that emphasizes equality, 
involvement, participation and social welfare, Latin American democracies are perceived by 
their citizens as mostly procedural -given that their institutional face is the most trusted- and still 
lack significantly in areas that directly address the importance of the citizen and the quality of 
citizenship for the political system and for society.  
 Between 2006 and 2010, all components of this index have registered a regular increase 
in trust levels for the whole region. Like the institutional legitimacy index, the highest levels of 
trust in political institutions are found in Uruguay, El Salvador and Costa Rica
45
 while Argentina, 
Peru and Ecuador register the lowest levels of trust in the whole region. It is also interesting to 
observe that lower levels of trust in political institutions studied in this chapter are mostly 
registered in South American countries, raising the question if South and Central America should 
be considered two separate regions as far as democratic legitimacy is concerned or, more 
cautiously, as far as the institutional structure of democracies is concerned.  
 The lower levels of trust in the judicial system guaranteeing a fair trial are registered in 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Argentina (again South American countries) and with this, a pattern 
seems to emerge wherein these countries are repeatedly among those with low levels of general 
trust in the political system and its institutions, as illustrated in Graph 3.  
                                                 
45
 In all three cases, trust levels are over 70 points in the 100-point scale.  
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Graph V-3. Legitimacy of political institutions, comparative perspective. Source: AmericasBarometer by 
LAPOP, 2010.  
 
Uruguay and Honduras are, again, the countries with higher levels of legitimacy of the 
political institutions. As previously stated, this is not a permanent pattern in the case of 
Honduras, but a data point that must be taken within the recent historical context of that country. 
After the 2009 constitutional crisis and the tense period of the de factogovernment that it 
experienced up to January 2010, the Supreme Court declared that the newly established 
government was legal and constitutional. This statement jump started a new democratic 
strengthening for the country. Honduran citizens responded to it with a vote of confidence in the 
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State and its main institutions, as was registered by the 2010 round of the LAPOP public opinion 
survey held almost immediately after the restablishment of democracy.  
Historically, legitimacy levels of political institutions in Honduras were low
46
 in 2006, 
slightly lower in 2008 (previously to the crisis) and in 2010 they experience a statiscally 
significant increase of at least 10 points on the 100-point scale that can only be attributed to a 
confidence vote of the citizenry in the new government in order to overcome the State crisis (see 
Figure R in the Annex section).   
Something similar happens in the case of El Salvador. Legitimacy levels are slightly 
higher than in Honduras, but an important increase is registered between 2008 and 2010. Trust in 
the national government, Congress and the Supreme Court has increased by at least 10 points in 
this two year period after experiencing a drop between 2006 and 2008, probably due to the 
effects of the economic crisis and high levels of criminality and corruption that the long political 
management of ARENA could not improve.  
In 2009, Mauricio Funes and the FMLN won the election under the banner of fighting 
corruption and reducing crime. The 2010 survey was impelemented approximately 10 months 
after the Funes government was inaugurated and reflects two things: 1) a confidence vote from 
the citizenry for the new government and the new direction laid out by it for the country and 2) a 
satisfactory evaluation of the new political program in El Salvador.  
Results for the system support index show the general pattern of distribution of 
legitimacy (see Figure Q, Annex section). The countries with lower support levels are Argentina, 
Paraguay, Peru and Ecuador in that order.  
                                                 
46
 Trust averages in Honduras are historically low both for the legitimacy index as well as for the individual 
variables in the index.  
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In the case of Argentina, data are available only for the 2008 – 2010 period during which 
levels of legitimacy of the political institutions has remained low and even register a slight 
decrease between 2008 and 2010. Variations of trust in political institutions in the index show a 
strong decrease of trust in the national government in the two year period (8 points on the scale), 
as does trust in the Supreme Court and political parties. Trust in Congress and the justice system 
has also remained low. This is an indication that, although Argentina is going through reform 
and institutional strengthening processes that seem to have popular support, despite data from 
studies that emphasize the degree of citizen satisfaction with the political system and the 
increasing legitimacy of the first years of the decade, the LAPOP public opinion survey data 
register citizen scepticism or dissatisfaction when evaluating institutional performance between 
2008 and 2010.  
As for Peru and Paraguay, average levels of legitimacy of political institutions was 
consistently low in the 2006 – 2010 period. The only exception in the level of trust is Congress 
in Paraguay, which is high and has been increasing significantly since 2006. The other 
institutions continue to be poorly evaluated by the citizenry in both countries.  
Countries with low levels of legitimacy of their political institutions and system support 
have been consistently among the lowest levels since 2006, suggesting a pattern of institutional 
weakness and instability in the political life of these countries, with the exception of Honduras in 
2010.  
When taking into consideration the average levels of system support and institutional 
legitimacy for the Latin American region, results show an optimistic view for democracies in the 
region. The 2006 – 2010 period can be considered a beneficial one for the region taken globally 
even when some cases, taken individually, show negative results.  
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This conclusion is supported by the fact that all components in both indexes taken 
individually have increased on average for the whole region since 2006, including trust in 
political parties and the belief in receiving a fair trial from the justice system.  
Also, in all cases for all countries in the sample, the average levels of system support are 
higher than the averages of legitimacy of political institutions. A logical way to understand these 
results is concluding that citizens are comfortable with the principles structuring the democratic 
system, which should refelct values and principles of their societies. But when it comes to 
assesing institutional performance, their vision is more critical because political institutions are 
perceived as more tangible elements, managed by individuals that mishandle them or take 
advantage of their position. Corruption has a persistently negative influence on legitimacy in all 
countries.  
Additionally, political institutions, their performance and the individuals running them 
are constantly subject to criticism and attacks from the media, while the principles that underlie 
the structure of the political system are seldom discussed in the public sphere.  
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Predictors of Institutional Legitimacy and System Support  
A linear multivariate regression analysis has been conducted in this section for each of 
the dependent variables, i.e. system support and legitimacy of political institutions. The objective 
is to discover which factors influence citizens at the individual level to evaluate institutional 
performance favorably or unfavorably and to discover what causes the variations in perception 
about democratic legitimacy as measured by these two indexes.  
 
Graph V-4. Predictors of legitimacy of political institutions at the individual level.  
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010. 
 
 
Results are similar for both indexes and are summarized in Table V.1, in the section 
below. The same variables influence them in the same direction but with different intensities. 
Variables with statistical significance exercise their influence on the system support and 
institutional legitimacy variables independently of the effect of other significant variables in the 
model.  
The multivariate linear regression model includes the same variables for both indexes, 
Satisfaction with democracy
Preference for democracy
Governmental efficiency
Satisfaction with President
Perception of corruption
Perception of individual economic situation
Perception of national economy
Education
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95% CI
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
R-squared =0.442
F=1480.260
N =26625
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because both refer to the same concept, but from two different dimensions and approaches. 
Hence, they should be sensitive to the influence of the same elements although they are not 
identical. If they were, there would be no reason to measure them with different indicators or 
from different approaches.  
 
Table V-1. Predictors of system support and legitimacy of political institutions. 
  Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010. 
 
Independent Variables  
Model: linear regression 
System support 
Legitimacy of 
political institutions 
Education -.884* -1.316* 
Approval of the president’s work .0608* .1066* 
Perception of national economy .037* .0271* 
Perception of personal economy .048* .0378* 
Efficacy of the government’s 
performance  
.354* .4525* 
Perception of corruption -.0327* -.0564* 
Preference for democracy .0451* .0217* 
Perception of the degree of 
democracy 
.1234* .116* 
Country -.355* -1.951* 
Rsquared 0.3418 0.4445 
N 26.444 26.577 
 
 
Being a multidimensional concept, the different dimensions of the concept will arguably 
respond to at least two sets of variables: a common set that influences the entire concept and 
separate sets that act on a specific dimension. This chapter focuses on finding the important 
elements in the set of variables that influence the entire concept of legitimacy, and therefore, it 
makes sense to assume that these “core” variables will be significant for both indexes modeled in 
the analysis.  
The model also includes the fixed effect of the variable country for both indexes
47
. 
                                                 
47
 The reference category is Peru as the country with lower levels of legitimacy.  
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Results show that, independently of the effect of individual predictors of legitimacy in both 
dimensions, the national context is a real effect that is specific for each case. In other words, 
independently of the individual level of education or the satisfaction with democracy in each 
country, the fact of being a citizen of any given country in the sample also influences the 
individual perception about democratic legitimacy.  
This is the truly “political culture” variable that achieves to measure – in an aggregate 
way- what academics have been trying to disaggregate for so long: people behave differently 
from one country to another just because they are culturally part of that national political 
community, and this is so even among groups of citizens that share characteristics at the 
individual level. That is, a rich and educated female in Uruguay will not necessarily support the 
system in the same degree that a rich and educated female in Brazil would, or in Costa Rica or in 
Argentina. Their levels of system support will differ not because they are different among each 
other –they share three individual level variables: they are all rich, educated and female- but 
because they live in different countries and belong to different political communities.  
The fixed effect of each country has also been calculated in another model and is 
summarized in Figure U in the annex section. Results indicate that citizens in Uruguay, 
Honduras, Mexico, Costa Rica and Colombia will report higher levels of legitimacy of the 
political institutions and system support than Peruvian citizens independently of the other 
intervening variables. In the same way, citizens of Ecuador, Brazil and Paraguay will report 
lower levels for both indexes than citizens of Peru.  
It is important to understand that the contextual effect measured by the fixed effects by 
country is independent from the other intervening variables in the model. For example, the 
country effect of Brazil determines lower levels of institutional legitimacy than in Peru, but 
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legitimacy is higher in Brazil than in Peru due to the combined effect of all variables in the 
model that counteract the national context effect.  
Another example shows that, despite being very different national contexts, Mexico and 
Argentina display similar perceptions and levels of satisfaction with democratic performance. 
Argentina is a much more egalitarian society than Mexican society, therefore it could be 
expected that Argentineans are more satisfied with democratic performance than Mexicans but 
nevertheless, other elements in the Argentinean political process are generating dissatisfaction 
with democratic performance in that country. On the other hand, Mexico has a serious problem 
with criminal levels linked to drug traffic, especially in certain areas of the country; this problem 
reduces satisfaction with the performance of a system that cannot guarantee the safety of its 
citizenry. These two cases illustrate the specific nature of the influence of national context on the 
expectations and individual citizen evaluations of democratic performance of the system and its 
institutions.  
Graph V.5, below, illustrates the influence of four important variables about individual 
perceptions of system support and institutional legitimacy. The light blue line represents the level 
of system support and the dark blue line the level of institutional legitimacy. In all cases, the 
average level of system support for all countries in the sample is higher than the average level of 
institutional legitimacy.  
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Graph V-5. Predictors of system support and legitimacy of political institutions.  Latin American average. 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010 
 
 
Data analysis shows that the effect of education, taken as a global average for all 
countries in the sample, has a negative effect on individual evaluation of system support and 
institutional legitimacy. The higher the level of education of respondents, the lower their 
perception of both legitimacy indexes will be. This outcome is a very interesting one since it 
contradicts theory from developed countries, which states that the opposite effect is to be 
expected in the relation between education and legitimacy. In other regions in the world, the 
more educated citizens perceive higher levels of legitimacy of the political system.  
Possible answers to this outcome in the Latin American regions could address the 
generalized low levels of education in the region when compared with developed countries or a 
cultural explanation that addresses a general sense of mistrust in governments and public 
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institutions for the region. For the purposes of this chapter, this specific effect will not be studied 
more in depth partly due to a lack of sufficient data on the matter.  
The perception of corruption in public offices also affects the perception of legitimacy in 
a negative way. The higher the perception of corruption is, the lower the perception of system 
legitimacy (in both indexes) will be. This is a good example of the influence that lack of political 
trust can have on democratic and institutional stability. 
Citizens with positive perceptions about the efficacy of governmental performance
48
 in 
important fields of public life will report higher levels of perceived system and institutional 
legitimacy. The elements in the index cover a wide range of problematic areas common to most 
of the countries in the sample. Each element addresses a real issue in everyday life; hence, it is 
not an index that requires individuals to be highly educated or informed about political issues. 
Rather, it addresses issues that exist in the daily experience of citizens’ political life and makes 
them perfectly fit to evaluate the degree of efficiency in governmental performance.  
Citizens in all countries have expectations regarding the degree of democracy expressed 
in the political system. The regime can call itself democratic, but are democratic principles, 
procedures and values evident in its institutions, laws and performance? The higher the 
perception of democratic principles active in the political system, the higher the perception of 
legitimacy will be.  
The same logic applies to those who express a preference for democracy as the 
government principle over other forms of government even when democracy is not perfect as a 
concept and as an active principle. Individuals who value democracy more as a form of 
                                                 
48
 Components of this index refer to the current government’s performance on fighting poverty, unemployment and 
corruption in public offices as well as their efforts for improving safety. The index also includes an item that 
evaluates the degree to which the government promotes and protects democratic principles. The index is reliable and 
reports an 0.9 Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient. 
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government will be more willing to support the democratic system despite an unsatisfactory 
performance.  
In all countries without exception, the perception of the degree of democracy exceeds the 
average satisfaction with democratic performance. Citizens recognize the existence of a 
democratic regime much more in Uruguay and Costa Rica than in Mexico, Nicaragua or 
Guatemala, but in all cases the system’s performance does not match the intrinsic degree of 
democracy of the political system. In general, countries where the perception of the degree of 
democracy and satisfaction with democratic performance is higher are those with higher reports 
of system support and institutional legitimacy.  
Finally, as for the importance of the subjective perceptions on the economic situation, 
individuals with favorable perceptions about the economic situation, both the national and the 
personal situation, will report higher levels of perceived system and institutional legitimacy. The 
clear relation between perceptions of legitimacy and perceptions of the economic situation 
(Duch, Palmer et al. 2000) suggest that this is also an important consideration when evaluating 
the system and institutional performance.  
The first section of this chapter referred to the importance given to the economic 
dimension in legitimacy and system support studies, mainly in developed countries. Findings of 
the data analysis suggest that economic considerations are also important for Latin American 
citizens when evaluating the principles and performance of the political system.   
The next section of the chapter will analyze in depth the importance of the economic 
dimension for legitimacy evaluations in Latin America, based both on subjective measurements 
of perception of the national and individual economic situation and on objective measurements 
of the economic situation at the individual level (wealth) measured based on possession of 
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material goods
49
 and classified by wealth quintiles.  
Since the previous findings report that contextual effects on legitimacy at the country 
level exist, an objective measurement of socioeconomic strata at the country level has also been 
included in the model through the Human Development Index (HDI) for each country for 2010
50
. 
HDI is used as an expression of the general socioeconomic level of the population in one country 
and not just as an aggregate measure of wealth generation. HDI is a more appropriate item that 
covers areas beyond the political arena.  
Finally, the model includes another contextual variable, the Gini coefficient
51
 by country, 
a measure of the degree of equality or inequality in the distribution of income among the 
population in each country. This coefficient has been included in the model with the goal of 
balancing the relative position of each country in relation to its level of economic and social 
development but also taking into account the spread of wealth and welfare among the population.  
Theoretically, it is to be expected that higher socioeconomic levels will generate a higher 
perception of legitimacy than lower socioeconomic levels by means of a more favorable 
evaluation of institutional performance when economic outcomes are better or generate stability. 
Evidence from previous works combined with findings from the subjective measurements of 
perception of economic situation suggests that this assumption can be valid both at the country 
and at the individual level.  
The analysis has run a mixed-effects regression model for the system support and the 
institutional legitimacy index including objective and subjective indicators of socioeconomic 
                                                 
49
 Individual wealth measurements based on possession of material goods is a more effective measurement than 
income and even more so when data are gathered by public opinion surveys. Individuals tend to consistently under 
report income all over the world whereas the report of material goods such as owning a house, a car, appliances, 
computers, etc. successfully captures the socioeconomic level of the respondent.  
50
 Source: HDR 2010, UNDP.  
51
 Source: HDR 2010, UNDP. 
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level by country and individual in the sample. Table V.2 summarizes the findings of this 
analysis.  
 
Table V-2 Mixed effects analysis of level of development and wealth distribution on legitimacy of political 
institutions and system support. 
 
 
Mixed Effects regression    # of obs      = 30689 (legitimacy) 
Prob> chi2        = 0.0000    # of obs      = 30453 (support) 
 Legitimacy of political 
institutions 
System support 
Variables Coefficients P>z Coefficients P>z 
Quintile 1 1.541416 0.000 .7137722 0.031 
Quintile 5 -2.740704 0.000 -1.662353 0.000 
Perception of national economy .2268084 0.000 .1845667 0.000 
Perception of personal economy .0889582 0.000 .0888269 0.000 
HDI 2010 4.752757 0.034 6.832873 0.001 
Gini coefficient -.2430971 0.000 -.0349883 0.377 
 
Findings of this regression analysis confirm the theoretical assumption that economic 
considerations, at both the individual and aggregate levels, have a real and statistically 
significant effect on legitimacy evaluations measured in two dimensions, system support and 
institutional legitimacy. All economic variables, objective and subjective, are statistically 
significant in both models.  
Outcomes also confirm what the multivariate linear regression indicated. The better the 
individual perception of the national and individual economic situation, the higher the perception 
of institutional legitimacy and system support will be.  
The objective measurement of socioeconomic level of the respondents at the individual 
level yields interesting outcomes. This item has been separated into two variables, one that 
registers the effect of the poorest 20% of the population (quintile 1) and another that registers the 
effect of the richest 20% of the population (quintile 5). While the effect of the poorest 20% is 
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positive in the model, the effect of being in the top 20% richer layer is negative.  
This suggests that there is a real difference of perception and evaluation of democratic 
performance and legitimacy between the richest and the poorest sectors of population based on 
individual wealth. Additionally, this finding is not an indication that the effect of wealth in 
legitimacy evaluation changes gradually with the increase of wealth, but only that there is a 
difference in appreciation of the democratic system between the richest and the poorest 
individuals in society.  
As for the country level aggregate variables, both the level of development measured by 
HDI and the income distribution measured by the Gini coefficient are statistically significant in 
the model. Thus, the effect of the economic context also has a real effect on legitimacy 
evaluations by the citizenry in both dimensions measured by the dependent variables.  
Findings of the analysis confirm the existence of a linear positive
52
 relation between the 
average socioeconomic level of the countries and the degree of legitimacy of their political 
institutions, showing that as the level of national development increases so does the perception of 
institutional legitimacy. Nevertheless, the weight and statistical significance of the HDI in the 
regression are weak so it cannot be assumed that the level of development by itself is determinant 
of the degree of legitimacy of the political institutions in place, although it has incidence on the 
allocation of legitimacy. 
                                                 
52
 The slope of the line representing the linear relation is calculated based on the mixed effects regression for the 
legitimacy of political institutions index. The relation, although weak, is statistically significant.   
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Graph V-6. Distribution of legitimacy of political institutions by HDI 2010.   
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010 
 
 
 The statistical significance of the Gini coefficient, which expresses the degree of equality 
in income distribution within each country, is higher than that of the HDI variable, but only for 
the institutional dimension of legitimacy and yields no significant outcomes for the system 
support model, suggesting that inequality in distribution may be interpreted as a failure in 
performance of the political institutions exclusively and not as a reflection of the principles and 
values underlying the democratic system. 
 Most of the countries in the sample fit into the linear relation and follow the assumption 
that richer countries will display higher levels of democratic legitimacy following that a certain 
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economic threshold has been considered a requisite for the existence of democracy itself in 
earlier academic works. The fact that there are exceptions in the region does not decrease the 
validity of the finding and, despite few exceptions, the general effect of the economic context 
exists, has been proven by the statistical analysis and is valid for the region as a whole.  
 Outliers like Peru, Argentina and Honduras can be explained by other variables 
especially strong at the time of the survey as a result of the historical process of those countries 
which includes political instability, mistrust in the institutions or insecurity situations.  
 Also, a quadratic function of the effect of HDI on democratic legitimacy has been tested 
and its explanatory force is slightly stronger than the linear model, without turning it into a 
strong determinant of democratic legitimacy by itself but opening the field for a deeper 
consideration of the economic threshold going back to the prerequisite hypothesis (see graph of 
quadratic function of HDI in the Annex section - Figure W).  
  Figure O in the annex section illustrates the distribution of legitimacy of political 
institutions taking into account the socioeconomic gap classification. There is no evidence of a 
coincidence between the distribution of legitimacy and the wealth gap by country which was 
shown by findings in this study. But there is a coincidence when it comes to countries classified 
as high inequality countries (wide socioeconomic gap
53
) and their registered levels of 
institutional legitimacy as measured by LAPOP data. Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay and 
Nicaragua are grouped together in the low HDI
54
 - low legitimacy countries category. Honduras, 
as previously explained is a low HDI country but its legitimacy level in 2010 is higher than 
usual.   
                                                 
53
 Countries classified in this category by the UN-ECLA publication are: Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras 
and Paraguay.  
54
 Compared to other regions in the world, the HDI level of these countries is classified as medium, but in relative 
terms, compared to other countries only in the Latin American region, their HDI level is low.  
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Despite having been determined based on different and unconnected variables, this 
coincidence strengthens the assumption of the existence of a pattern of classification based on 
level of wealth, development or socioeconomic stratum at the country level, and it supports the 
fact that inequality in distribution of wealth is interpreted as faulty performance of the 
governments in place, which is damaging to the democratic legitimacy of those countries.  
The coincidence in distribution of legitimacy among countries with medium and small 
gaps is less evident, although Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica (countries with a small gap) are 
high DHI – high legitimacy countries in the LAPOP sample. Argentina and Venezuela belong to 
the same group but are outliers because they display low levels of legitimacy on account of their 
specific political dynamics.  
 
 
Graph V-7. Legitimacy of political institutions and system support by DHI 2010 and Gini coefficient.  
Fitted values based on mixed effects regression.  
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010 
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Graph V.7 shows the statistical relation between the socioeconomic classification at the 
country level and the legitimacy of political institutions and system support as an average for all 
the countries in the sample. In both cases, a higher development level or a better distribution of 
wealth will increase the perceived legitimacy levels for the sample.  
If the economic context and economic considerations at the individual level exercise such 
a clear effect on levels of political legitimacy, there must also be clear differences between 
countries and individuals of low and high socioeconomic strata.  
Table V.3 summarizes the legitimacy averages for four groups established by combining 
objective measurements of socioeconomic stratum at the country and the individual level. These 
four groups are: low socioeconomic stratum individual in a rich country, low socioeconomic 
stratum individual in a poor country, high socioeconomic stratum individual in a rich country 
and high socioeconomic stratum individual in a poor country. 
 
Table V-3. Legitimacy of political institutions: legitimacy averages according to individual and country 
socioeconomic stratum. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010 
  
 Economic stratum  
HIGH (country) 
Economic stratum  
LOW (country) 
Economic 
stratum  
HIGH 
(individual) 
 
2006: 43.53 
2008: 43.99 
2010: 46.42 
 
2006: 38.78 
2008: 36.74 
2010: 44.71 
 
Economic 
stratum  
LOW 
(individual) 
 
2006: 44.24 
2008: 45.03 
2010: 47.56 
 
 
2006: 39.21 
2008: 36.43 
2010: 41.77 
 
According to theoretical assumptions and evidence from statistical analyses, it can be 
expected that the averages of legitimacy of political institutions registered by the rich 
135 
 
individuals
55
 group in rich countries are the highest averages and that legitimacy registered for 
poor individuals in poor countries are the lowest.  
Outcomes summarized in Table V.3 confirm the differences existing among legitimacy 
averages among the established groups. The main statistically significant differences are found at 
the country level; legitimacy of political institutions averages differ among rich and poor 
countries more so than among individuals, strengthening the argument for the influence of the 
economic context on the level of legitimacy of the political system.  
The lowest legitimacy average in 2010 is registered for the group of poor individuals in 
poor countries, as expected. Nevertheless, the difference of average between poor and rich 
individuals in rich countries is not statistically significant.  
These findings express that when taking objective economic conditions or the 
socioeconomic level of development into consideration, the country level predominates over the 
individual level unit of analysis. 
Concluding thoughts 
Democratic legitimacy is ultimately determined by individual evaluations about the 
performance of the democratic system based on their expectations and observation of the 
performance of democratic institutions. The combined performance of democratic institutions in 
all areas of State activity determines the general level of democratic legitimacy in each country. 
Some areas of activity are more important than others for individual citizens, depending on their 
personal everyday experience in the public sphere, and will therefore have more influence on 
their evaluations.  
                                                 
55
 The correct term for naming this group is “high socioeconomic stratum”, but rich/poor terms are easily 
understood.  
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The study of the effects of the economic and political performance of central institutions 
of the political system has been prioritized in this approach to Latin American democracies under 
the assumption that citizens pay special attention to the combination of the economy and politics 
and to the manner in which political institutions perform in the management of economic issues 
simply because the latter directly affect the everyday life of citizens in all countries.  
This issue is even more relevant in a context of a worldwide economic crisis with 
consequences that have also been felt in Latin America, mostly in big market countries, but in a 
lesser intensity than expected thanks to the political capacity of the region to use the necessary 
institutions and channels needed to overcome the crisis. From this perspective, the high 
legitimacy and stability moment that countries in the region are living can be easily explained.  
The variations in legitimacy levels among countries in the area do not suggest a regional 
or micro-regional pattern in legitimacy distribution. Rather, the dispersion of legitimacy seems to 
depend on the context, political and economic processes specific to each country and on the 
validity of the context effect on the country level, as the findings of the analyses implemented in 
this chapter indicate. 
As a general average, democratic legitimacy in Latin America has been strengthened 
between 2006 and 2010, even including cases such as Peru, Paraguay and Argentina with the 
lowest levels of institutional legitimacy in the region. This new strength of legitimacy can also be 
understood as a strengthened relation between the State and the citizenry or as an improvement 
in the performance of political institutions acknowledged by citizens and rewarded by a vote of 
confidence in the democratic system in Latin America.  
Evidence suggests the existence of a real relation between economic conditions 
(objective and subjective) of the individuals and the national context and the legitimacy 
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attributed to the democratic regime and its institutions, mainly those in charge of managing the 
economies of the countries. With this, it is not stated that the economy is the only determinant of 
legitimacy in Latin America, but that it is a central consideration when individuals evaluate 
democratic performance and legitimacy in the region.  
Because of this, poverty issues, inclusion, equality, corruption and even citizen safety are 
relevant and can affect levels of democratic legitimacy. Directly or indirectly, all these issues are 
linked to economic problems and areas that generate inequality, marginalization of large portions 
of the population, insecurity, instability and mistrust in the general population. These are central 
considerations for the evaluation of institutional performance in areas that directly affect 
people’s lives.  
Data for 2010 show a general positive evaluation of institutional performance for most of 
the countries in the sample. Data also show that there is a clear distinction of preferences and 
expectations about democratic performance between poor and rich individuals. Democratic 
institutional performance is satisfying for poorer individuals, who appear to be satisfied with 
undergoing institutional reform processes that aim to extend the range of their rights, equality 
and inclusion in political life and society; on the other hand, it seems less satisfying for richer 
individuals with different expectations and with access to political and social privileges not 
available to other sectors of society.  
These findings can also be an indication of a general approval of institutional reform in 
the region that aim at deepening democracy in a more inclusive process with more participation 
opportunities, with policies to fight corruption, reduce criminality rates and improve the delivery 
of ordinary and distributive justice. All of these are areas of political action that respond to 
concerns and needs of Latin American society and that, in one way or another, find an answer in 
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the series of institutional reforms changing the face of Latin American democracies and moving 
them closer to the citizenry in a highly complex public sphere.  
A pattern that clearly shows in the data is that the level of system support is consistently 
higher than institutional legitimacy on average in all countries and over time. Far from being 
negative, this is evidence of the ability of citizens to make a distinction between the different 
dimensions of legitimacy, its conceptual and principle dimension and its more pragmatic and 
institutional dimension.   
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Chapter VI . Conclusion  
 
A study of what ultimately determines the legitimacy of a political system involves 
several challenges in varying dimensions. The most important of these is that legitimacy is 
subjectively determined through individual evaluations that citizens make about the reliability 
and performance of political institutions and actors.  
Moreover, these individual evaluations are made within a complex context of political, 
economic, social and cultural elements that combine into a very specific national reality at any 
given point in time, which will also have an impact on how citizens perceive the political system 
to which they are subject. In their aggregate form, these individual perceptions and evaluations 
about the political system will determine its level of legitimacy.  
However, the study of political legitimacy is not a new undertaking in the academic field. 
Decades of collected knowledge and evidence gathered around the globe have proven that 
political legitimacy is not only crucial for the survival of the political system, but also for 
maintaining the adherence of the citizenry to the system.  
Despite the enormous amount of effort allocated to this enterprise, very little has actually 
been done in this field in Latin American academia and even less in Bolivian academia. Most of 
the studies of political legitimacy in the Latin American context are based on qualitative data, 
through elite interviews or with a narrow coverage of the population, making it difficult to draw 
conclusions at the national level.  
In addition, the only serious and continued efforts to study political legitimacy based on 
quantitative evidence that is representative of the national population are not undertaken by Latin 
American political or social scientists, but mostly by foreign academics interested in the region. 
Of these works, the LAPOP studies have introduced the notion of studying democracy and the 
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legitimacy of the democratic system through the citizenry and based on quantitative data. 
Latinobarometro and the World Values Survey are the only other sources of such data in the 
region that also carries out studies in a periodic and continued manner.  
The results presented in this study approach the issue of political legitimacy of the 
Bolivian democratic system using two dimensions of measurement: one based on political trust 
and the other on institutional performance. Additionally, the measurement based on political trust 
is disaggregated at two different levels, system support and institutional legitimacy, which allow 
a richer insight into what determines political legitimacy and provide evidence of the fact that 
citizens are aware of at least two different dimensions that are sources of political legitimacy, the 
dimension of the principles or concepts guiding the system and the more pragmatic dimension of 
the institutions that carry out and embody those principles.  
The evidence shows that citizens evaluate these two dimensions separately, always 
assigning a higher value to the principles dimension over the institutional dimension in all cases 
in Bolivia at the national and sub-national level, as well as in all Latin American countries 
included in the study.  
The predictors of the levels of perceived legitimacy of the democratic system vary 
according to the country in the case of the comparative analysis including all countries in regards 
to the specific political, economic, social and cultural context, but there are some common 
elements that indicate that, despite being determined by subjective considerations and while 
being influenced by the specific national context, citizens all over the Latin American region 
share some common notions as to what makes a democracy legitimate.  
In general terms, the combined performance of democratic institutions in all areas of 
State activity determines the general level of democratic legitimacy in each country. Some areas 
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of activity are more important than others for individual citizens, depending on their personal, 
everyday experience in the public sphere, and will therefore have more influence on their 
evaluations.  
Among these shared elements across the region, the relevance of both objective and 
subjective economic conditions as one of the main considerations that individuals use to assess 
the democratic performance and legitimacy of the political system is evident. The relation 
between the economic situation and perceived legitimacy of Latin American democracies is a 
positive relation, indicating that the better these countries fare economically, the greater the 
strength of the democratic systems.  
This finding is of the utmost relevance for all countries in Latin America because of the 
very high levels of inequality, exclusion and poverty that are already a trademark of most of 
these countries. In addition, these results are the more relevant precisely because they are 
provided directly by the citizenry of each country in combination with aggregate data (objective 
measurements of the level of development and economic performance of each country) and not 
solely by conceptual indexes or exclusively second level and aggregate data.  
One of the most important contributions of this work to the body of knowledge about 
democratic legitimacy in Latin America is that it shows results at different levels, national sub-
national and regional, but also at the individual level. Results show a clear difference of 
perceptions about the performance of democracies between poor and rich individuals, these 
results being valid for the entire region. There are no other such studies available for the Latin 
American region as a whole, combining aggregate and individual level data and using such a 
broad public opinion dataset that allows both, to study all countries at the same time and to be 
able to draw conclusion at the individual level.   
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Taken together, these results clearly show that economic issues in all their different 
expressions, such as poverty, exclusion, inequality, and economic discrimination, the lack of 
economic opportunities, unemployment and differentiated access to employment by sex or age, 
are relevant and can effectively affect the way the average citizen perceives democracy. 
This issue becomes more relevant when contextualized within the recent worldwide 
economic crisis that affected big market countries more intensely, but was nonetheless lighter 
than expected, in all probability due to the political capacity of the countries in the region to 
navigate the crisis through institutional provisions like social reform that has also been 
appreciated by the citizenry. This explains a general improvement in legitimacy levels over the 
last five years. Political reform, although weak in the economic area, has been able to address 
social issues of inclusion and participation which are also a central concern of Latin Americans. 
If anything, these results express the deep complexity of current Latin American societies, which 
in most cases have highly ethnically and racially diverse populations and complex cultural 
systems, partly due to their colonial inheritance.  
Since economic considerations are not the only factors that influence the perception of 
democratic legitimacy, findings in this work do not show a clear regional pattern of variation in 
legitimacy according to economic wellbeing or simple level of national wealth. In other words, 
the relation is not as simple as to determine that poorer countries show lower levels of 
legitimacy. Rather, variations in legitimacy levels depend on a combination between economic 
conditions and the specific political, social and cultural processes of each country. Therefore, 
countries that are not rich but that have a slightly better distribution of wealth or somewhat more 
egalitarian societies will improve their perceived level of legitimacy.  
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There are two other common elements that most Latin Americans consider when 
assessing the performance of the democratic system, the evaluation of its performance in regards 
to insecurity (violence) and corruption. Even in countries with low rates of violence, security is a 
raising concern, and it plays an important role in the evaluation of institutional performance of 
democracies across the region. Even more so, the persistence of corruption practices among 
public officials clearly undermines perceived democratic legitimacy for all countries included in 
the analysis, even in those were corruption rates are low.  
Taken all together, these findings make the need to improve economic conditions across 
the region visible, especially in regards to distribution and to strengthening the degree of 
institutionalization to minimize the occurrence of extra-institutional channels of action and 
decision and improve accountability of public officials, as expressed by the citizenry. Although 
these are common topics of political discourse across the region, citizens seem to be expressing 
the need to take the discourse into public policy, for it is at the dimension of institutional 
performance where evaluations of legitimacy are weaker.  
The central body of work in this study concentrates on perceived levels of democratic 
legitimacy in Bolivia. The in depth study of the national and sub-national dynamics of 
democratic legitimacy in Bolivia is an important contribution to both the study of legitimacy and 
the advancement of social sciences in the country, especially from the methodological field. 
Quantitative studies are few and new to Bolivian social sciences, and only recently have Bolivian 
academics started gathering quantitative public opinion data designed specifically for the study 
of politics. Political science is in itself a new field in Bolivia, and there are no data sources as 
complete, extended and wide ranging as the LAPOP data set while being both representative at 
the sub-national level and specifically targeted for the study of political issues.  
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Additionally, aside from LAPOP publications, there are no regional studies (at the sub-
national level) produced in Bolivia with the capability of comparing all nine regions to each 
other and being able to reach conclusions for the political dynamics in each region individually. 
Therefore, this work is an important innovation in Bolivian political science and a contribution to 
the comprehension of regional political processes and the public perception of democracy. It is 
also the only one of its type since the implementation of Constitutional reform in 2009, which 
introduced the figure of regional autonomies to the political configuration of the country. 
The findings in this study are deeply insightful into the regional dynamics of Bolivian 
politics and in many ways differ from the common idea that nothing relevant happens outside the 
“axis” departamentos which are considered to be the only politically relevant regions. The data 
show that at least two departamentos demonstrate a very weak adherence to the political system, 
and the model of analysis applied across regions cannot explain the political dynamics in 
Chuquisaca and Potosi, with the lowest levels of system support in the country. In general, 
results suggest that reform or conflict is likely to originate in regions outside the political axis 
among those regions currently further from access to political power and influence.  
Results show that regional dynamics of politics are not necessarily aligned to national 
processes, issues or agendas but tend to respond strongly to regional issues. This is especially 
true for the Eastern region now undergoing a political positioning along regionalist discourse, 
positioning and policy.  
Perhaps the most relevant finding, though, consists of the fact that evidence shows 
persistent differences in the perceptions and attitudes of two distinct groupings of departamentos 
in the variables guiding their evaluation of democratic institutional and regime performance. 
This should not be understood as a political polarization in the country, but rather as the 
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manifestation of two differing ways of understanding politics, democracy, the political system 
and, by extension, life in general. It can also be characterized as the existence of two different 
political cultures in the country, an Eastern and a Western political culture.  
Strengthening this finding is the fact that analysis results show that decision making 
heavily has “moved” from the local to the regional arena, with regional institutions increasing in 
importance and levels of trust in all nine regions overtaking the municipality, which was the 
strongest political arena since the Law of Popular Participation was created in the mid-nineties.  
But the evidence also shows that coincidences in political culture across-regions remain 
and that they are stronger than regional differences as predictors of democratic legitimacy in the 
principle and institutional dimensions, indicating the persistence of the national Bolivian culture. 
Governmental economic performance and trust in the Regional Government are strong and 
robust predictors of both dimensions of democratic legitimacy across the board.  
The relevance of economic considerations as predictors of democratic legitimacy is also 
confirmed in Bolivia through the analysis of legitimacy at the sub-national level. As a general 
rule, objective evaluations of the economic situation (aggregated data about regional wealth) are 
stronger predictors of democratic legitimacy than subjective assessments of personal economic 
conditions and also stronger predictors than socio-demographic variables. This is also a very 
relevant finding, for results show that the existing serious economic differences among the nine 
regions in Bolivia have a real effect on how citizens perceive the democratic system. Moreover, 
this is a reason for concern, because the unequal distribution of wealth and influence among 
regions is systematic and persistent throughout the modern period in Bolivian history.  
Yet, additional results suggest that, despite the robust effect of economic variables as 
predictors of democratic legitimacy, the political momentum of Bolivia’s current political 
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process overpowers the effect of economic conditions and political variables turn out to be 
stronger predictors of democratic legitimacy, countering what is to be expected according to the 
theory about the strength of the economic effect.  
This is the result of a recent process of extreme personalization of politics, in which most 
political authority and legitimacy depends on the figure of President Morales, not his party but 
he himself, undermining the institutional capacity and effectiveness of the Bolivian State that has 
been in place since 2005. Approval of the President’s performance is among the strongest 
predictors of democratic legitimacy across regions, independently of their political positioning in 
the national arena. As a result, perceived legitimacy improves mediated by political alignment 
with the President.  
In measuring democratic legitimacy by way of individual evaluations of institutional 
performance, outcomes of the analysis show that these are powerful predictors and an important 
source of perceived democratic legitimacy in the country. The pragmatic dimension of 
legitimacy (institutional performance) is a robust predictor of legitimacy at the national level and 
taking the nine regions individually.  
When this variable is applied to the analysis, the regional pattern found in the initial 
analysis is confirmed. There are consistent differences among the Eastern and Western macro-
regions with higher levels of dissatisfaction in the Eastern departamentos when taking the 
combined index and also when measuring each of the components individually. The relevance of 
institutional performance for legitimacy considerations varies between these two groups and 
cultures.  
Ultimately, legitimacy depends on trust, and the distribution of political trust across 
regions in Bolivia is relatively homogeneous, and no regional configuration of differing political 
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cultures plays a role in this arena. Citizens are aware of different levels of government and judge 
institutions distinguishing between the national and the regional arena, and regional 
configurations of trust are only present when it comes to trusting regional institutions.  
As for the combined set of political institutions, the persistent problem of a dual society, 
colonial inheritance, inequality, exclusion and discrimination, all features of a complex 
multiethnic society, has a significant effect on variations in levels of political trust. Ethnic 
identity and discrimination experiences are strong predictors of loss of trust across regions with 
indigenous individuals, and people who have experienced discrimination repeatedly are less 
trusting in political institutions and therefore their perception of the legitimacy of Bolivian 
democracy is lower than that of the non-indigenous population and those who have not 
experienced discrimination.  
In conclusion, the legitimacy of Latin American democracies relies heavily on a complex 
balance of the economic, social and political wellbeing of their citizens, as has been confirmed in 
depth by the study of the Bolivian case. Poverty and the national level of wealth matter, but what 
matter most are distribution of wealth and conversely, exclusion, discrimination and inequality 
which have the power to effectively weaken democracies. Politically, it is crucial to translate 
discourse into policy and guard the institutional integrity of the State. Socially, tolerance is key 
to achieving more horizontal societies, despite any level of cultural or ethnic complexity.  
And finally, legitimacy cannot be analyzed without taking into account the specific 
national, social, economic, political and cultural context. Legitimacy is the result of culture and 
needs to be treated and interpreted within the context in which it is produced.  
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Chapter II 
 
 
Figure A. Trust in the justice system, by departamento. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer, by LAPOP 
 
 
Figure B. Trust in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, by departamento. Bolivia 2010. Source: 
AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
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Figure C. Trust in Gobernaciones by ethnic identification and year. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
 
 
Figure D. Trust in indigenous autonomies, by departamento. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer, by 
LAPOP. 
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Figure E. Trust in political parties by departamento. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
 
 
Figure F. Trust in the Military, by departamento. Bolivia 2010. Source: AmericasBarometer, by LAPOP 
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Figure G. Trust in the police by perception of insecurity and scenarios of discrimination. Bolivia 2010. 
Source: AmericasBarometer, by LAPOP 
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Chapter III 
 
Figure H. Factor analysis of items on the efficacy of government’s economic performance index. Source: 
AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 2010.  
 
 
 
 
Figure I. Fitted values Institutional Legitimacy by efficacy of governmental performance. Bolivia 2010. 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
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Figure J. Government performance: government improves security. Bolivia 2010. Source: America 
Barometer by LAPOP 
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Figure K. Fitted values: effect of individual wealth on system support by departamento. Bolivia 2010.  
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
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Chapter IV 
 
 
Figure L. Trust in Regional Government by departamento. Bolivia, 2010. AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
Figure M. Approval of President’s performance by departamento. Bolivia, 2010. AmericasBarometer by 
LAPOP 
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Figure N. Relation between evaluations of governmental economic performance and legitimacy of political 
institutions (fitted values), by departamento. Bolivia 2010. AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
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Chapter V 
 
 
Figure O. Legitimacy of political institutions, comparative perspective. Countries color-coded according to 
economic gap classification.   Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010 
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Legitimacy of political institutions 
Country Mean N Std. Deviation 
México 50.1639 1464 23.01728 
Guatemala 38.2179 1449 23.70310 
El Salvador 52.8468 1495 21.19237 
Honduras 55.7376 1483 18.33320 
Nicaragua 39.5810 1454 24.64171 
Costa Rica 49.9827 1481 26.23681 
Panamá 49.8151 1483 20.46610 
Colombia 51.1006 1454 21.39313 
Ecuador 39.8621 1486 20.46775 
Bolivia 45.7805 1463 18.97651 
Perú 34.4748 1494 19.63770 
Paraguay 37.5635 1446 21.24121 
Chile 49.9315 1474 21.61797 
Uruguay 62.4060 1465 22.59714 
Brazil 47.6474 1467 23.99525 
Venezuela 41.8608 1467 28.40253 
Argentina 34.7647 1474 23.34397 
Dominican Republic 47.4263 1474 24.90194 
Total 46.0751 26475 23.77144 
Figure P. Means of legitimacy of political institutions, by country. Source: AmericasBarometer, by LAPOP 
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Figure Q. System support average, comparative perspective. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legitimacy of political institutions (historical perspective) 
Honduras 2006:     43.59 Perú 2006:   33.9 Argentina 2008: 37.9 El Salvador 2006: 46.4 
Honduras 2008:     39,85 Perú 2008:  33.01 Argentina 2010: 34.7 El Salvador 2008: 42.9 
Honduras 2010:     55,73 Perú 2010:  34. 47  El Salvador 2010: 52.8 
Figure R. Legitimacy of political institutions. Historical perspective. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 
2010 
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INDIVIDUAL 
/ COUNTRY 
Economic stratum  
HIGH 
Economic stratum 
LOW 
Economic 
stratum  
HIGH 
 
2006: 52.56 
2008: 52.07 
2010: 55.04 
 
2006: 47.82 
2008: 44.23 
2010: 52.95 
 
Economic 
stratum  
LOW 
 
2006: 53.07 
2008: 53.32 
2010: 55.39 
 
 
2006: 50.29 
2008: 45.35 
2010: 51.89 
Figure S. System support: legitimacy averages by individual and country socio-economic stratum. Source: 
AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010 
 
 
 
Figure T. Relation of system support and institutional legitimacy with HDI 2010 (fitted values – linear 
relation). Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010.  
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* sig. <.005 
Figure U. Predictors of system support and legitimacy of political institutions.   
Fixed effects for each country is included. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010. 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables  
Model: linear regression 
with fixed effects 
System support  
Institutional 
legitimacy 
Education -.7578* -.9109* 
Wealth (by quintiles)   
Approval of the 
President’s performance  
.0639* .0906* 
Perception of the 
national economy 
.0483* .4822* 
Perception of the 
personal economy 
.0506* .0418* 
Efficacy of 
governmental 
performance  
.3600* .4575* 
Perception of corruption -.0397* -.0582* 
Preference for 
democracy 
.0382* .0194* 
Perception of degree of 
democracy 
.1127* .1118* 
Country    
Mexico 4.966* 9.217* 
Guatemala  1.937* 
El Salvador  4.488* 
Honduras 4.0505* 9.597* 
Nicaragua   
Costa Rica 6.752* 4.513* 
Panama   
Colombia 4.288* 5.700* 
Ecuador -6.388* -4.764* 
Bolivia   
Paraguay -3.125*  
Chile -6.069* -4.577* 
Uruguay 2.425* 6.233* 
Brazil -7.790*  
Venezuela  3.551* 
Argentina   
Dominican Republic  4.349* 
Rsquared 0.3656 0.4686 
N 26.444 26.577 
174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure V. Predictors of system support at the individual level. Average for all countries in the sample. Source: 
AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010.  
 
  
Satisfaction with democracy
Support for democracy
Government's efficacy
Approval of presidential performance
Perception of corruption
Personal economic situation
National economic situation
Education
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
95% CI
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
R-squared =0.334
F=870.967
N =26512
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Figure W. Quadratic function of the effect of HDI on legitimacy of political institutions, aggregated by 
country. Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
